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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did

the presiding

judge

of

the

Third

Judicial

District err by disqualifying Judge Rigtrup after a trial on
the merits.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant prays this Court to vacate the order of
the trial court by which Judge Rigtrup was disqualified, and
to remand the case to Judge Rigtrup for further proceedings.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Madsen entered into a home loan with Prudential.
The trust deed contract required Madsen to pay funds into an
escrow account.

Madsen claimed

that he was entitled

interest or earnings on the escrowed funds.

to

The case was

brought as a class action.
The

case

is

nearly

twelve

years

old.

After

exhaustive litigation, including two appellate decisions,
the case was finally tried on the merits before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup.

Madsen v. Prudential Savings & Loan, 558 P.2d
1337 (Utah 1977); Madsen v. Prudential Savings & Loan, 635
F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980).

Near

the

end

of

the

trial

(but prior

to

any

ruling), Judge Rigtrup remarked that he had once financed a
home

through

Prudential.

(Exhibit

A

at p.

4 94.) Judge

Rigtrup reminded counsel that he had disclosed that relationship early in the case.

(Exhibit A at p.495.)

Prudential's attorney replied that he could not
recall the earlier disclosures.

(Exhibit A at pp.494-497.)

Nevertheless, Prudential did not object to Judge
continuing on the case.

Rigtrup

Nor did Prudential seek a continu-

ance.
Therefore, Judge Rigtrup proceeded with the trial
and made a bench ruling against Prudential in the sum of
2
$134.70
(Exhibit
A
at
p.507.)
Prudential
waited
thirty-nine days after the ruling before filing a motion to
disqualify

Judge

Rigtrup.

(R.

99.)

Prudential

further

moved to void all of Judge Rigtrup's prior rulings.
The disqualification
Fishier (presiding judge).

motion was

heard

by Judge

Judge Fishier granted the motion

and vacated all prior rulings of Judge Rigtrup including the
trial.

(Exhibits B and C.)

This verdict involves only the named plaintiff
Richard Madsen. Further, proceedings on the class aspects
of the case were reserved.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The sole basis for disqualification in this case
was an "appearance of bias".

In fact the trial court made a

specific finding that there was no actual bias.
there

is

no

statutory

authority

to

However

disqualify

a

judge

without a specific finding of actual bias.
An "appearance of bias" might constitute a violation of the Code of Judicial Conducte

However, if a judge

violates the Code, the judge should be penalized.

Here the

plaintiff was penalized, and no action was taken against the
judgee
At most, Judge Rigtrup had a remote, contingent,
and speculative

interest of about $134 in this case.

A

recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court has squarely ruled
that judges need not be disqualified for such speculative
trivia.
Finally,

Prudential

objection to Judge Rigtrup.

failed

to

make

a

timely

Rather, the judge's decision

was announced, over a month before Prudential got around to
objecting.

Thus, any error was waived.
POINT I
JUDGE RIGTRUP'S INTEREST IN THIS CASE
IS REMOTE, SPECULATIVE, AND TRIVIAL

A.

Judge Rigtrup is Not a Member of the Existing Class.
This case was certified as a class action years

ago by Judge Croft.
emphasize

that

existing class.

Judge

(See Exhibit D.)
Rigtrup

is

not

It is important to
a

member

of

that

Indeed, the trial court has made a specific
3

finding that Judge Rigtrup is not a party in this case.
(Ex. C.)
It is true that Judge Rigtrup did have a home loan
with

Prudential.

However,

discovery

has

shown

Prudential uses several different contract forms.
38.)

that

(R. 15 to

Judge Rigtrup1s contract was completely different.

(Exhibit E.)

Thusf
existing class. 3

Judge Rigtrup is not a member of the

Since Judge Rigtrup is not a member of the existing class, he has no direct interest in this case.

B.

Judge Rigtrup Has Ruled That He Will Not Be a Part of
Any Future Enlarged Class.
After the class was originally certified, Madsen

amended the complaint (R. 59 to 86.)

The amended complaint

added new theories and sought to enlarge the class.

The Trust Deed For The
Certified Class (ExhibTt D)

The Rigtrup Trust Deed
(Exhibit E)

[T]he trustor agrees to pay to
the beneficiary, upon the same
day each month, budget payments
estimated to equal one-twelfth
of the annual taxes and insurance premiums . . . and said
budget payments are hereby
pledged to the beneficiary as
additional security for the
full performance of this deed
of trust and the note secured
thereby. The budget payments
so accumulated may be withdrawn
by the beneficiary for the payment of taxes or insurance
premiums due on the premises.

. . . [T]he Mortgagor will pay
to the mortgagee, on the first
day of each month . . . the
premiums that will next become
due and payable on policies of
fire and other hazard insurance covering the mortgaged
property, plus taxes and
assessments next due on the
mortgaged property . . . such
sums to be held by mortgagee
in trust to pay the ground
rents, premiums, taxes and
assessments before the same
become delinquent.

4

Under

the

amended

complaint

all customers

would have become class members.

of

Prudential

Obviously, Judge Rigtrup

would have been a member of that enlarged class.
However, the amended complaint only set forth a
potential class.
certified.

The class would have no existence unless

Rule 23(c)(1) U.R.CoP. states;

As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine
by order whether it is to be maintained.
Plaintiff did make a motion to certify the new
class.

(R. 87.)

Rigtrup

would

If the new class had been certified, Judge

have

become

a member

of

that

new class.

However, Judge Rigtrup denied the motion to certify the new
4
class. (R. 90.)
In summary, Judge Rigtrup was a potential class
member, but he squarely ruled that the enlarged potential
class would not come into existence.

4
The motion is sometimes referred to as a motion
to add a defendant class. However, in substance the motion
sought to add a defendant class, and to substantially
enlarge the plaintiff class. The new enlarged plaintiff
class would (if certified) have included Judge Rigtrup.
It is difficult to see how there could be an
"appearance of bias* in this case when Judge Rigtrup ruled
against his own interest in this matter-

5

C.

Judge Rigtrup Can Never Bring an Individual Claim.
We have demonstrated in paragraph A and B, above,

that Judge Rigtrup was not a member of any existing
potential class of plaintiffs in this case.

or

Indeed, the

sole basis for disqualification was that a new individual
lawsuit might be brought

in the

future, and

Rigtrup might benefit from that future lawsuit.

that Judge
Specifical-

ly, the lower Court stated:
[I]t is conceivable that his
[Judge Rigtrup] rulings could be binding
upon Prudential in other similar litigation in which Judge Rigtrup could be a
plaintiff on a theory of collateral
estoppel.
(Exhibit B at P.3 and 4.)
In theory, Judge Rigtrup might have filed his own
individual lawsuit against Prudential.

However, any inde-

pendent claim which Judge Rigtrup might have had is squarely
barred by the statute of limitations.
7
Annotated.

§7-17-9(2) Utah Code

In short, Judge Rigtrup has no present interest in
this case; no future interest in this case; and not even any
theoretical interest in this case.

The Rigtrup mortgage was paid off in December of
1983 which was apparently before Judge Rigtrup was ever
assigned to sit on this case. (R. 203.)
7
"No action seeking payment of interest on or
other compensation for use of the funds in any reserve
account for any period prior to July 1, 1979 shall be
brought after June 30, 1981".

6

POINT II
THE DISQUALIFICATION WAS BASED SOLELY ON AN
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
The grounds for disqualifying a judge are found in
Article VIII, §13 of the Utah Constitution,

(Exhibit F)

§78-7-1 of the Utah Code Ann. , (Exhibit G) and Rule 63 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (Exhibit H.)
Rule 63, U.R.C.P. states that "Whenever a party «,
. . shall make and file an affidavit that the Judge . . .
has a bias or prejudice . . • such judge shall proceed no
further therein . . .fl

(Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, it

has always been the law in Utah that a disqualification must
be based upon an actual bias.

See Haslam v. Morrison, 113

Ut.14, 190 P.520 (1948).
However, the trial court made a specific finding
that there was no actual bias:
[A] 11 prior rulings of Judge
Rigtrup be and the same are hereby set
aside on the ground and for the reason
that although there is no actual bias on
the part of Judge Rigtrup, there is an
appearance of bias* (Exhibit C.)
Rather,
squarely

on

an

Judicial Conduct.

the

trial

"appearance

court
of

based

bias"

disqualification

under

the

The trial court stated:

More importantly, in 1974 the Utah
Supreme Court approved the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Canon 3(c) provides
that a judge shall disqualify himself in
a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.
This
court concludes that the impartiality of
Judge
Rigtrup
might
be
reasonably
questioned, and therefore Judge Rigtrup
should have disqualified himself . . .
(Ex.B at p.3.)
7

Code

of

POINT III
THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Madsen does not concede that the Code of Judicial
Conduct is applicable in this case.

(See Point IV below.)

However, if the Code of Judicial Conduct is applicable, the
trial court erred by failing to give effect to the entire
code.

(See Exhibit K.)
Specifically, the trial court relied on Canon 3C

which states:
A Judge should disqualify himself in a
proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned . . .
However, the trial court erred, as a matter of
law, by failing to give effect to other related sections of
the

Code,

Section

3C(l)(c)

further

clarifies

that

appearance of bias arises when:
[H]e knows that he, individually or as a
fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy . . . that could be substantively affected by the outcome of the
proceeding: [Emphasis added.]
Thereafter, Section 3(C)(3)(c) explains that:
"financial interest" means ownership of
a legal or equitable interest, howeverf
small . . . except that . . . (iii) the
proprietary interest of a policy holder
in a mutual insurance company, of a
depositor in a mutual savings assn. or
similar
proprietary
interest
is
a
"financial interest" in the organization
only if the outcome of the proceedings
could substantially affect the value of
the interest . . . [Emphasis added.]

8

an

In this case, the named plaintiff, Madsen, won a
judgment of approximately $134.

If Judge Rigtrup had some

theoretical claim, it would probably be in that same range.
It is not likely that Judge Rigtrup would sell his
soul—or his good reputation

for $134.

Furthermore, the

Code of Judicial Conduct clearly excludes such trivia.
United
issue.

States

Supreme

Court

has

ruled

squarely

on

The
this

On April 22, 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court decided

Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaVoie, 106 S.Ct. 1580 (1986) . The LaVoie
case is attached as Exhibit L.

In LaVoie, the appellant

sought to disqualify Justice Embry of the Alabama Supreme
Court.

The claim against Justice Embry was that he had

already filed a personal lawsuit virtually identical to the
suit at bare
Embry.

The U.S. Supreme Court disqualified Justice

The Court reasoned?
We hold simply that when Justice Embry
made that judgment, he acted as w a judge
in his own case."

106 S. Ct. at 1586.
Appellant further sought to disqualify the entire
Alabama Supreme Court.

Appellant claimed that members of

the Court were potential members of a class action which
would be affected by the ruling.

On that issue, the U.S.

Supreme Court ruled that:
[W]hile these justices might
conceivably have had a slight pecuniary
interest, we find it impossible to
characterize that interest as "direct,
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary"
[Citations omitted] . . . Any interest
that they might have had when they
passed on the rehearing motion was
9

clearly highly speculative and contingent . . . With the proliferation of
class actions involving broadly defined
classes, the application of a constitutional requirement of disqualification
must be carefully limited.
[Citation
omitted.]
106 S.Ct. at 1588.
The ink is still wet on LaVoie.
is squarely in point.

Moreover LaVoie

Finally, LaVoie makes good sense.

There is just no reason to disqualify a judge who has some
contingent speculative

interest in a case involving only

$134.

entitled

The

judges.
that

public

is

to

have

respect

for

its

But the public is not so gullible as to believe

judges

sell out

for the prospect

of maybe

someday

getting $134.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PUNISHED THE WRONG PARTY FOR
THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
If Judge Rigtrup violated
should be punished.

an ethical canon, he

Canon 3B(3) of the Code of Judicial

Conduct states that:
A Judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a
judge or
lawyer
for unprofessional
conduct of which the judge may become
aware. [Emphasis added.]
Indeed, Article VIII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution
(Exhibit F) sets up the procedure for disciplining a judge.

10

In this case Judge Rigtrup was not punished at
alio

Rather, the court imposed a drastic financial penalty

on a wholly

innocent party—the

plaintiff s*

It will be

expensive to redo years of Judge Rigtrupfs work.

Indeed,

plaintiff's expert witness fees were over $20,000 before the
trial even started (R. 347.)
In summary, the alleged wrongdoer (Judge Rigtrup)
gets off "scott free."
(plaintiff)

On the other hand, an innocent party

is severely

penalized

in time and money

for

Judge Rigtrup's alleged faults.
This court should rule, as a matter of law, that
innocent

parties

should

not

be

penalized

when

a

judge

violates his ethical duties.
POINT V
THE ERROR, IF ANY, WAS WAIVED
Judge Rigtrup claims that he had disclosed any
potential bias several years ago.
over whether
disclosure.

or

not

Judge

Rigtrup

There is some conflict
did

make

that

early

(See Statement of the Case.)

However, there is no dispute that Judge Rigtrup
did disclose any potential bias at trial and before any
decision was announced.

(See generally Exhibit A.)

When Judge Rigtrup announced the potential bias at
trial,

Prudential

waited

to

see

who

would

win.

Then

thirty-nine days after the trial, Prudential finally filed
its motion to disqualify Judge Rigtrup.

11

Plaintiff has located no case in history

(in the

U.Se or elsewhere) where a party, knowing of the grounds for
disqualification, could gamble on the outcome of a case and
then have the judge disqualified after the decision.
Rather, the law is that a party, having knowledge
of facts, that would be grounds for disqualification, must
assert his objection before the judge rules on the merits of
the

case; e.g.,

Carpenter v.

State, 575 P.2d

26

(Kan.,

1978); Jones v. Stivers, 447 S.W.2d 869 (Ky., 1969); In Re:
United Shoe Machinery, 276 F.2d 77 (1st Cir., 1960); Keating
v.

Superior

Court,

289

P.2d

209

(Cal.

1955);

Aker

v.

Coleman, 88 P.2d 869 (Id., 1939); State et. rel. Shufeldt v.
Armigo, 50 P.2d 852 (New Mex., 1935); Rademacher v. City of
Phoenix, 442 F. Supp. 27 (D. Ariz., 1977); Williams Mauseth
Insurance Brokers, Inc., v. Chappie, 524 P.2d

431

App. 1974).
Here are some typical examples of the Rule:
A litigant who for the first time
during trial learns of grounds for
disqualification must promptly make his
objection known as by moving for a
mistrial . . . He may not, after learning of the grounds for disqualification,
proceed with the trial until the court
rules adversely to him and then claim
the judge is disqualified.
Williams Mauseth Insurance Brokers,
Inc. v. Chappie, 524 P.2d 431, 434
(Wash. App. 1974).

12

(Wash.

One may not gamble on a favorable
ruling and then move for disqualification upon receiving an adverse order.
Lagies v. Copley, 110 Ca. App« 3d
958, 966, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368, 372
(1980) .
* * * *

A party "is not permitted to wait
until he sees which way the decision is
going before deciding whether to stay
with or try to eliminate the judge."
West v, Superior Court, 448 P.2d 57
(Ariz. 1968) .
POINT VI
PRUDENTIAL HAD AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY
TO MAKE A TIMELY OBJECTION
We

have

noted,

above,

that

Prudential

waited

thirty-nine days before objecting to Judge Rigtrup sitting
on the case.

On that subject the trial court ruled that:

In reviewing the transcript, this court
concludes that counsel for the defendant
could not be expected to interrupt the
proceedings to file an affidavit of
prejudice. (R. 239.)

IL-fltf)

Nothing could be further from the truth. A fair
reading of the transcript (Exhibit A) shows that Judge
Rigtrup conducted the hearing with great dignity and
courtesy. Prudential's counsel was in no sense cut off.
Specifically, Prudential's counsel addressed the court on
^Q^mr*- separate occasions during the closing minutes of the
hearing. (See Exhibit A.) On any of those eleven occasions,
Prudential merely had to say, "we object". Indeed, at the
end of the hearing, Judge Rigtrup stated: "Do you desire to
take any further exceptions to my openness and candor?"
(See Exhibit A at p. 509.)
Despite that invitation,
Prudential remained silent!

13

What the record shows is simply that Prudential
decided

to

"wait and see" what the ruling was.

Indeed,

Prudential's counsel agreed that Judge Rigtrup could proceed:
MR. PALMER: No prejudice arose in
the court1 s mind because of the fact
that we collected a mortgage escrow from
you?
THE COURT:

No.

MR. PALMER:
Okay.
anything else but ask.

I

can't

do

(Exhibit A at pp.496 and 497.)
Of course Prudential could have done
else.

Prudential could have used

something

the magic words:

"we

object."
This is not a case where the trial court weighed
conflicting evidence.
court.

The trial transcript is before the

There is simply no evidence that the Judge somehow

interfered with Prudential's counsel.
POINT VII
PRUDENTIAL HAD AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO
CONSULT WITH ITS CLIENT REGARDING DISQUALIFICATION
Prudential's next excuse for the thirty-nine day
delay was that counsel had to confer with the client.

The

trial court bought that argument hook, line and sinker.

The

court ruled:
when Judge Rigtrup made his
statements about being a former borrower
of Prudential . . . insufficient notice
was given to Prudential's counsel of the
fact to allow counsel to confer with his
client to determine the appropriate
course of action. (R. 239.)
14

The

argument

is

frivolous.

The

appropriate

procedure would have been to move for a continuance? prepare
the

necessary

paperwork?

receiving the ruling.

and

file

the

papers

prior

to

Rather, Prudential wanted to gamble

on a favorable ruling—and decide on disqualification later.
Moreover, Prudential's
was

in

the

courtroom

at

all

executive
times•

vice

(See

president

Exhibit

I.)

Counsel could have consulted with him during a break.
POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO
APPLY THE CORRECT BURDEN OF PROOF
In each of the prior points, it has been assumed,
arguendo,

that Judge Rigtrup did not disclose his relation-

ship with Prudential before the trial.

However, there is

substantial evidence in the Record that Judge Rigtrup did,
in fact, disclose that relationship years earlier.
To begin with, Judge Rigtrup testified that:
THE COURT:
As
I've
indicated
earlier, and no objection was interposed, I was a customer of Prudential
Federal Savings and Loan Association and
paid without default for 25 years at
four and three-quarters percent, and I
knew that was such a fine deal that my
wife couldn't get me to remodel or move
or anything because I was 23 years old
when I first took the mortgage out, and
I computed that out and I thought, why,
those robbers, they are charging me
twice what I'm borrowing from them, and
that's unfair. As I got older and more
sophisticated, I —

15

MR. PALMER: Your Honor, I hate to
interrupt, but I need to make the point
that this is news to me, that you had
been a customer of Prudential.
THE COURT:
I
several occasions.

indicated

that

on

MR. PALMER:
I beg the Court's
pardon, but that is news to me. I don't
recall that at all—if anybody else
does—recall telling me that, and I —
THE COURT:
I indicated that in
these earlier meetings that I had paid
my loan off at some point and Ifd had a
loan with Prudential Federal Savings.
(Exhibit A at pp.494 and 495.)
Before

the decision was

announced,

counsel

for

Madsen testified:

MR. DEBRY:
I do recall some
conversation, I think, off the record,
of that effect, and I honestly don't
recall who was present. But it was a
comment that was made from time to time.
(Exhibit A at p.495.)
In

addition,

counsel

for

Prudential

testified

that:
I remember Judge Rigtrup disclosed in
chambers, with other counsel present
and approximately two years ago, that he
had a mortgage with a reserve account,
but heQ did not say it was with Prudential. 8
(R. 117.)

Q

It should be remembered that plaintiff had
already alleged a new defendant class of all lenders in
Utah. Thus it must have been apparent that Judge Rigtrup
was a potential party—or a potential member of that larger
class.
(See Point IB, above.)
Nevertheless, no one
objected.
16

At least one other disinterested party has testified?
I recall that at some point in the
proceedings over which he presided,
Judge Rigtrup indicated that he had an
old, low-interest mortgage loan which
contained a reserve account clause. He
further ruled that he would be able to
rule
objectively
in
these
matters
despite that fact.
I recall that he
asked if anyone had any objections to
his sitting on these cases. I do not
recall anyone so objecting.
(Exhibit
J.)
Faced with this testimony, Judge Fishier said he
simply couldn't make up his mind:
I am going to find that neither party
has established any preponderance of
evidence that Judge Rigtrup either disclosed or did not disclose any interest
that he might have had. (R. 804-805.)
* * * *

I think the next issue has got to be the
timeliness issue, and I'm going to rule
now that to me the evidence is evenly
balanced as to whether or not there was
a disclosure. (R. 864.)
In its final order, the trial court allocated the
burden on Madsen.

Thus the evidence was evenly balanced;

but since Madsen had the burden, Madsen lost:
The Court has reviewed the Affidavits on
file, which are conflicting. A remittal
of disqualification is in effect an
affirmative defense to the Motion to
Disqualify a sitting judge. In reviewing the record, the Court can find
nothing which persuades it by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a
remittal
of
the
disqualification.
(Exhibit B at p.4.)
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However, the law is to the contrary,

A judge is

presumed to be fair and to conduct proceedings with impartiality.

One who challenges the regularity of the court1s

proceedings has the burden of proof.

See In Re:

Interna-

tional Business Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 932 & 934 (2nd
Cir.

1980); In Re;

Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 389

(1st Cir. 1961); Matter of Estate of Baird, 406 N.E.2d 1323,
1331 (Ind. App. 1980); Mayo v. Beber, 2 Cal. Rptr. 405, 409
(1960); Bass v. Minich, 109 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Ark. 1937).
In summary, the trial court placed the burden of
proof on the wrong party.
POINT IX
IF JUDGE RIGTRUP IS DISQUALIFIED, THAT
SHOULD NOT VOID ALL OF HIS PRIOR RULINGS
After the trial, the Court issued its ruling from
the bench.

However, before the formal findings of fact were

signed, Prudential

filed

its motion

to disqualify

Judge

Rigtrup.
If Judge Rigtrup is disqualified, the parties need
not be put to the expense of a new trial.

It should be

sufficient for a new judge to take over after the findings
of fact have been entered.

It is the general rule that the judicial
act of a disqualified judge is voidable
but not void . . . According to the
weight of authority, at Common Law, the

18

acts of a disqualified judge are not
nullities; they are simply erroneous and
liable to be avoided or reversed on
proper application, although they cannot
be impeached collaterally • . .
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges, §231.
* * * *

Disqualification from presiding over a
particular case
does
not disqualify
the Judge from otherwise holding the
part of term which is occupied by the
trial . . . or from ruling on those
matters under submission.
156 C.J.S. Judges.
In addition, Madsen relies on the case of Coastal
Petroleum Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 378 So.2d 336 (Fla. App.
1980) .

That case is very similar to the Madsen case.

In

Coastal, the judge heard the trial, and announced the substance of his rulings.
recusal.

Thereafter, motions were made for

The judge did recuse himself from hearing addi-

tional matters not yet tried.

However the judge reserved

jurisdiction to enter a final ruling on the matters already
tried and under submission.
ruling.
F.2d

266

The appellate court upheld the

See also Martys Floor Covering v. GAF Corp., 604
(4th

Cir.

1979).

afforded by this section.

"Only

prospective

relief

is

It cannot be used as a means of

obtaining a new trial."
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CONCLUSION

It is absolutely true that the public should be
protected from biased judges.

But it is equally true, that

the public should be protected from judge-shopping.

Indeed

our statutes provide:
If an application for an order, made to
a judge of a court in which the action
or proceeding is pending, is refused in
whole or in part, or is granted conditionally, no subsequent application for
the same order can be made to any other
judge, except of a higher court.
Utah Code Annotated, §78-7-19.
Prudential's attempt to disqualify Judge Rigtrup
after losing the case is thinly veiled attempt to violate
§78-7-19.
DATED this

' 7

day of _ ^

, 1986.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant
By:
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the c o n v e n i e n c e o f the r e c o r d
2 J

MR. DeBRY:

for

closings?

W e are p r e p a r e d

3

c l o s i n g at the c o n v e n i e n c e o f the C o u r t .

4

late

to p r o c e e d
If i t ! s

with

getting

—
THE COURT:

Ifm

7

MR. DeBRY:

Oh, we don't need a reporter.

3

MR. PALMER:

5

6

9 J

just, t a l k i n g a b o u t

record.

You m e a n

for c l o s i n g

O h , I think it should be r e p o r t e d , y o u r
Very

arguments?

Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

[Whereupon, closing arguments were

12

the

to the C o u r t by r e s p e c t i v e
THE COURT:

13

well.
presented

counsel.]
I had t h o u g h t e a r l i e r

that

14

I m i g h t go h o m e and spend

15

I've

16

and t u r n for the w e e k e n d

17 j

the b e n e f i t s of m y d e c i s i o n w i t h y o u a t t h i s p o i n t .

d e c i d e d t h a t I'd

18 (

some t i m e w i t h the c a s e , b u t

rather

let y o u g e n t l e m e n

So I 1 1 1

rather than m e .

The difficultyof

twist

the c a s e is n o t

share

because

I!ve

19 j

of the b a t t l e of the e x p e r t s , and I t h i n k

20

valuable training

21

I s u p p o s e t h a t has a p e r s o n a l

22

b o t h of t h e s e g e n t l e m e n .

23

difficulty

24

S e r v i c e c o m m i s s i o n e r s , they w i l l t a k e m y o p i n i o n or m y

25

r u l i n g or m y v i e w as a p e r s o n a l a f f r o n t to t h e m , m a y b e .

in t h a t at the P u b l i c

got

Service

flavor, because

Commission,

I respect

I like b o t h of t h e m . And

is t h a t they r e a c t like former

some

fellow

the

Public
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T h a t ! s not why the

i

And t h a t ' s c e r t a i n l y u n f o r t u n a t e .

2

case is a p r o b l e m to the C o u r t .

3

k i n d s of s u f f e r i n g for four y e a r s in t h a t these two lawyersj

4

h a v e t e s t e d m e , they have t w i s t e d m e and they have p u l l e d

5

and tugged m e and jerked and p r o p o s e d e v e r y

6

c o n c e p t t h a t y o u could come u p w i t h , and the substance

7

I f l l e x p o s e m y b i a s e s and m y p r e j u d i c e s and be very

8

with you.

9

I h a v e had

incremental

conceivable

I t h i n k there are some s u b s t a n t i a l

—

frank

kinds

10

of p o l i c y t h i n g s t h a t h a v e r e a l l y c a u s e d m e g r e a t

n

and t r a u m a .

12

was i n t e r p o s e d , I w a s a c u s t o m e r of P r u d e n t i a l

13

S a v i n g s & L o a n A s s o c i a t i o n and p a i d w i t h o u t d e f a u l t for

14

25 y e a r s at f o u r and t h r e e - q u a r t e r s p e r c e n t , and I k n e w

15

that w a s such a fine d e a l t h a t m y w i f e c o u l d n ! t get to

16

r e m o d e l or m o v e or a n y t h i n g b e c a u s e I w a s 23years old

17

w h e n I first t o o k t h e . m o r t g a g e o u t , and I computed

18

o u t and I t h o u g h t , w h y , t h o s e r o b b e r s , they are c h a r g i n g

19

me t w i c e w h a t I'm b o r r o w i n g from t h e m , and that's u n f a i r .

20

trouble

A s I've i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , and no o b j e c t i o n
Federal

that

A s I g e t o l d e r and m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d I

21

U

MR. PALMER:

Y o u r H o n o r , I hate to interrupt,]

22

but I n e e d to m a k e the p o i n t t h a t this is news to m e ,

23

that y o u h a d b e e n a c u s t o m e r o f P r u d e n t i a l .

24
25

THE COURT:

—

I i n d i c a t e d t h a t on s e v e r a l

occasions.
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1

?-* MR. PALMER:

I beg the Court's pardon,

2

but that is news to me.

I don't recall that at all —

3

if anybody else does —

recall you telling me that, and

4

I ~

5

THE COURT:

I indicated that in these earlier)

6

meetings that I had paid my loan off at some point, and

7

I'd had a loan with Prudential Federal Savings.

8

i

9

N

MR. PALMER:

Perhaps the Court is thinking

of conferences with other counsel.

10 |
11

-

I

The reason I make

the point is —
THE COURT:

My earlier conferences were

12

not with the two of you in this case, they were with

13 I

Mr- Billings, with Mr. Ashton, with you, with Mr- Giauque,

14 J

Mr. McDonough, with respect to whoever he represents.

15 I

It was Mr. Giauque or someone from that office. They

16 j were a corrective kind of a deal.
17

J

MR. PALMER:

In any event, I stand to raise

18

the point now that it is news to us.

19

I take it that the Court did not feel that it had any

20

prejudice because of that.

21

I

THE COURT: No.

22

)

MR. PALMER:

23

THE COURT:

I believe it —

All right.
I have a

recollection that

24

somewhere along the line I did make that disclosure.

25

I don!t know how you could be part of the community and
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be a homeowner and not have borrowed from someone.

And

2 I

so I think I make it very clear in one

3

kinds of meetings that my loan had been with Prudential

4

Federal.

5

)

of those collective

At any rate, it's a fact, and it was somethinjg

6

that I never tried to hide or have hid from anyone.

7 J

there's no sense of covering up.

8

error, it creates error.

9
9 |

that I did expose it, and whether you were there or

I guess if that creates

But so be it.

W

Mr. Lewis or anyone else, I don't know.

11

disclosure early on.

12

MR. DeBRY:

So

I have a recollectjion

I did make the

I do recall some converstions,

13

I think, off the record, of that effect, and I honestly

14

don't recall who was present.

15

was made from time to time.

16
17 I
18

MR. PALMER:

But it was a comment that

Could I inquire of the Court

when the loan was paid off?
THE COURT:

Probably two years ago.

I'm

19

not sure at what pint in the discussions I indicated

20

that, but I'm sure that in the presence of the collective

21

group that I indicated that I had been a borrower of

22

Prudential Federal Savings.

23

MR* PALMER:

No prejudice arose in the

24

Court's mind because of the fact that we collected a

25

mortgage escrow from you?
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. PALMER:

3

THE COURT:
to tell you.

MR. PALMER:

That ! s what I f ve been trying

I make the point because I

didn ! t want to go on and let the Court note
THE COURT:

8

9 J

I can't do anything

That was the intention.

6
7

Okay.

else but ask.

4
5

No.

—

I think I've made general commentjs

throughout that I have cussed financial institutions,

10

and customers do simply because they see inherent injustice)

11

about that.

12

has passed, has become much, much different at the end

13

of the 23 years.

14

of money was markedly greater, and that I would be a

15

damn fool to prepay.

16

for 25 years, and not a day sooner or a day later.

17

I'm just commenting generally in terms of unjust or whatevejr

18 I

The tension is between that to be gained and that to

19

be lost, I suppose, in my eyes.

20

that class actions are a form of champerty in maintenance

21

in that the one that substantially gains is the lawyer

22

or the expert.

23

he has struck a blow for freedom, I suppose, in the form

24

that the consumer has achieved balance.

25

And my perspective today, after 23 years

Far before that I could see the cost

So I paid faithfully every month
And

And I have a feeling

Mr. Madsen stands to gain little, except

Be seated, Mr. DeBry.
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1
2

MR. DeBRY:
on the r e c o r d .

I w a n t to m a k e an

objection

I really must.

3

THE C O U R T :

W e l l , sit d o w n .

4

MR. DeBRY:

Before you give your

decision,

5

I must make a comment, because

I k n o w the C o u r t is b e i n g

6

candid and t h i s has b e e n a long s t r u g g l e , and

7

says they are a l m o s t b r o k e b e f o r e t h i s *

8

m a y b e D e B r y w i l l m a k e some m o n e y , b u t I h a v e n ' t y e t .

9

But I r e a l l y m u s t i n t e r p o s e an o b j e c t i o n

Prudential

And you

at this p o i n t .

10

If the C o u r t h a r b o r s this type of p e r s o n a l b i a s

11

r e s p e c t to

THE COURT:

I'm

13

MR. DeBRY:

—

14

THE COURT:

I'm

MR. DeBRY:

I m u s t o b j e c t to the

16
17
18

the

with

—

12

15

say

just

—

class actions.
just t e l l i n g y o u

about

tension.

sitting on this case if y o u h a v e t h a t kind o f
THE COURT:

I'm

just t e l l i n g

Court's
bias.

you why

g e t t i n g to m y

I'm

19

g e t t i n g to m y r u l i n g and h o w I'm

ruling

20

and b e i n g o p e n and c a n d i d w i t h b o t h of y o u .

21

a built-in problem with class actions.

22

a beneficial result.

23

that I h a v e got to follow the law of the c a s e .

24

got the S u p r e m e C o u r t t h a t ' s t e l l i n g m e w h a t to d o .

25

have g o t a p r i o r t r i a l judge t h a t ' s told me w h a t to do

But

that's

They have

The difficult I am locked

achieved. !

into

is

I have
I
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1

as well, and the law is clear that I have got to do what

2

Judge Croft told me to do, because he has ruled on the

3

issue.

4

me to do, because they have ruled on the issue.

5

independent of what my personal thoughts or beliefs

6

are, I f m caught in a catch 22, and there is a realistic

7

tension in that process.

I have got to do what the Supreme Court ahs told

8
9

And

The tension is that in terms of the magnitude!
of the wear, what is to be gained by Mr. Madsen is

10

de minimis.

On the other hand, if the Court looks at

11

economic realities, the high cost of money, high cost

12

of labor and high cost of everything else, there is a

13 J

societal interest in maintaining healthy, vital financial

14

institutions that have the ability to fund building

15 I

construction, homes, and so forth, in our community.

16 J

And I simply observe that probably the savings and loan

17

associations have been very instrumental and important

18

in that particular process.

19

overview statement sayto what has troubled me, and it's

20

trouble me for a long time.

I simply make those as an

21

That's why I have invited you two to sit

22

down and strike a settlement, rather than impress that

23 I

heavy burden upon me.

24

Sit down, Mr. DeBry.

25

MR. DeBRY:

Your Honor

—
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1
2
3

THE COURT:
I get done.

You can take exceptions after

I'm trying to —MR. DeBRY:

I might note that I do have

4

an exception to take at this time before you give your

5 I

verdict in this matter.

6

THE COURT:

I haven't given a verdict.

7

MR. DeBRY:

With respect to class actions.

8

THE COURT:

I understand.

9
10
n

the tension lies.

That's where

And it's a troublesome decision.

It's

bothered me for a long time.
This is basically a contract case.

It's

12

a contract that was executed by people in Utah, to be

13

performed in Utah.

14

a federal regulation case.

15

back to Utah to be resolved in the Utah courts.

16

predecessor, Judge Croft, certified it as a class action.

17

I'm not the appellate court.

18

and until the Supreme Court corrects that as an error,

19

if it is, it's a class action.

20

and it is the function of this case as I ruled, and as

21

I think I'm compelled to rule, that as the Supreme Court

22

said, as a matter of contract law, the language contained

23

in the contract in question created a pledge, and that

24

based upon that pledge, Mr. Madsen and his wife were

25

entitled to an accounting for profits made, and were

It's not a federal case.

It's not

The federal courts sent it
My

I can't reverse Judge Croft

It has been certified
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entitled, at minimum, to an offset against their indebtedne
or I'd assume it would follow, a disgorgement of those
profits.
I view that as the law of the case, and
inescapable-

I also don't view this, even though cast

in the context of unjust enrichment, it gives me the
prerogative of trying the case based upon just and unjust
in terms of enrichment.
The Supreme Court says that the Madsens
are entitled to an accounting for profits, so that is
what I think I am obliged to follow.
at all by burden of proof.

Ifm not troubled

As far as I see day in and

day out, the concept was told over and over and over
to me as a lawyer, as I-practiced in these courts, by
D. Frank Wilkins in his rule, which was "He who alleges,
must prove."
That is the basic fundamental rule in this
case.

And the Court, given those limitations and

restrictions, had been tortured in terms of the decisional
process in this matter.

Whether one becomes an expert

or one does not, it's not a requirement or prerequisite
that you abandon common sense.
I graduated in accounting.

Mr. Norman knows that

So I do have some background.

I think too much, at times, is made of
the fact that it almost rises to a point of science rather
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than an art, though you use the term art.

And I guess

the best common sense example of why I perceive there
is some overkill in the area is that I was a farm boy,
and farmers, with the corner of their shopping bag and
a lead pencil, could do more in 15 minutes grappling
with weather, grappling with soil conditions, grappling
with fertilizing problems, grappling with a choice of
seeds and all that they have to program in, and still
persist in that activity day in and day out.

And that's

something which seems to me could confound enough cost
accountants to circle the globe-

It's not a science,

itfs an exercise in judgment.
And it seems to me that if the conclusions
that are followed by the cost accounting approach are
followed, management would have failed a long time ago.
The funds are and have been of benefit to Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan over the years.
a base over which to spread costs.

They provide

They provide a hedge

against default, and provide security.
I realize there are some federal regulations
about that, though Prudential, as did other savings and
loans, banks, and other institutions, followed the state
statute in terms of turning that practice around.

And

as I recall, part of the regulation provided that state
law could be files.

But if in the last years when costs,
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1

as you indicated, M r . Norman, went up enormously —

2

they did —

3

followed that analysis, would have somehow found a lower

4

cost alternative rather than keep a loss leader.

5

them more credit than that.

Prudential F e d e r a l , if it really

6

as

strictly

I give

There were certainly triple A accounts

7

that weren't collection problems in those accounts.

And

g I

as to t h o s e , I would submit that they would have found

g

some sort of service b u r e a u , or whatever, to perform

10

that function.

The generation of d e p o s i t s , the generation

11

of loans are essential productive features of their

12

bueiness.

13

function, other than as they perceive it to be essential

14 I

by virtue of federal regulations.

15

billing, receiving p a y m e n t s , and many of those other

1§

things is not greatly different,with or without escrow

17

accounts.

The function of escrow accounts is a nonessential

And the process of

18

The Court is persuaded of that clearly

19

and convincingly by a preponderance of the evidence.

20

It follows as night the day.

2i

I had experience as a young lawyer, going

22

out and opening an o f f i c e , of doing a lot of collection

23

work.

24

good secretary can push an awful lot of volume and paper,

25

and that was before word processing and the fine things

You do get established, and one lawyer and one
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1

that lawyers have today.

2

lithographs and other ways to maybe accomplish these

3

things in a less efficient way, but nonetheless, you

4

learn in a short time how to handle great volumes of

5

paperwork with a very small amount of people.

5

We understood that there ere

I f m convinced in a very persuasive way

7

that the function of servicing escrow accounts is not

8

a monumental task, and that it can be achieved by a relatively

9

small amount of people.

Once you shift from an escrow

10

environment to a nonescrow environment, many of the functicjns

n

that are performed in that department aren't going to

12

be greatly diminished.

13

they are going to keep the data processing capabilities,

14

and I'm really persuaded by Mr. Stewart ! s analysis that

15

if you have an appropriate allocation, it more common-

15

sensically follows that those costs be attributed to

17

the productive aspects of the business.

18

They are going to keep the building),

It does not appear to be rational at all,

19

as per Exhibit 8, that costs would escalate in that fashion!

20

and they would still maintain that function without making

21

some big corrections.

22

I think Mr. Norman and Mr. Stewart would

23

both recognize the judgment aspect of any allocation

24

process, and I think they would both recognize that they

25

neither one may have the perfect solution or all of the
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1
2

answers.
I think they both would be candid, and

3

I respect them for both being honest and upfront.

4

the computerized and mechanization process added such

5

a heavy burden to the cost, it would have been a better

6

management decision to persist with shoe boxes and a

7

mechanical process, rather than allowing the costs to

8

double in a short period of time when the benefit to

9

be gained was as minimal as it was.

10

If

I think, moreover, Mr. Stewart's analysis

11

of the escrow account balances were, as I recall, in

12

the range of 20 per cent lower.

13

that!s more accurate or less accurate than your analysis,

14

Mr. Norman, except that it demonstrates a conservative

15
16

I don't know whether

bias in favor of Prudential Federal rather than Mr. Madsen,
There was something said about working

17

capital, that it also seems to me there is —

I think

18

it's maybe unrealistic and idealistic to think that there

19

is instantaneous management of those funds, and there

20

may be a little bias in the analysis of Mr. Stewart,

21

and there is some justification of working capital slack.

22

Moreover, given the high interest rates and the levels

23

we're talking about, management doesn't let large amounts

24

of uninvested funds go for 60 days, and they are moving

25

them into a mode of investment where they can derive
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1

daily yield-kind of investments at times to keep the

2

funds working.

3

I'm impressed that the building is a sunk cost, and the

4

assignment of a large amount of that really doesn ! t track

5 I

the function.

As for the assignment of a lot of costs,

I'm convinced that advertising to generate
7 I

the productive aspect of the business; namely, loans

3

and deposits, doesn't have as part of its function to

9 J

generate escrow business.

They are not in the business,

10

really, of providing escrow business as a primary function

11

And I think the bulk of the high level management decisions)

12

really aren't involved in managing day-to-day escrow

13

decisions.

H I

clerical and doesn't require the highest order of skills.

15

It seems to the Court that most of that is

The high order of skills are more required,

16

though, in terms of investment decisions and things of

17

that kind.

18 I

that to that process appears to the court to be non founded!

19 I

in common sense.

So to apportion a substantial portion of

!

20

There were other specific things that I

21

think are of similar rationality as far as I view the

22

overall record.

23

enrichment kind of case, I think the Court would find

24

the decision easy.

25

in by a decision of the Supreme Court that simply found

If the Court feels it had an unjust

But my perception is that I am locked
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j

it to be a pledge, and that those funds had to be accounted

2

for to the customer.

3

and it's put me in a tortuous kind of position that,

4 J

notwithstanding my underlying biases and feelings, I

5

i

6

I

And it's that plain and simple,

feel that I have no choice
I think there have been errors in both

7

analyses in one way or another, but in thinking about

8

it all, the court finds and concludes that the approach

9

that Mr. Stewart took in his Schedule 7, which uses the
short-term T-bill rate more closely approximates the

10

short period of turnover with escrow accounts and the

11

investment options.

12

to conclude that on the Madsen account, during the period

13

from March 3, 1971 through June 30, 1979, that there

14
15

And the court finds it reasonable

I

16

was total cumulative earnings on the Madsen account earned
of $109.43.

And that it would further be appropriate,

17

as a finding,that as a matter of fact, that the Madsens

18 I

would have a total cumulative effect of earnings on those

19

funds bringing the total to $13 4.70.

20

MR. PALMER:

21

THE COURT:

$134.70?
Yes.

Plaintiffs, accordingly,
costs.

22

are awarded judgment for $134.70 plus allowable

23

And with respect to the mechanics, I haven't worked out

24

anything with respect to the overall class impact it

25

would have.

So the issue of what the ramifications are
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on a class basis are reserved for future consideration
to be determined, with both of you to have an opportunity
to review those matters as to how that should work out.
MR. PALMER:

Could I inquire, when the

Court says that if this were an unjust enrichment case,
the decision would be easy, what the Court means by that?
THE COURT:

I really -— my visceral reaction

is that I don't feel there's unjust enrichment.
MR. DeBRY:

Well, with that being said,

however, in the context that in this case we didn't put
on any evidence as to that.
THE COURT:

I make no finding thereon.

I'm being candid with both of you.
for me.

It's a tortuous process)

I think economic reality, considering all interests

involved, even though corporations make profits and so
forth, it bothers me, that bottom-line result, if I'm
affirmed.

But I think the evidence dictates that I must

find otherwise.
MR. PALMER:

All right.

I anticipate,

or I would have anticipated that regardless of which
side prevails at this point, that there would be an appeal
THE COURT:

I certainly recognize that,

and that's why I made the comments the second day, that
the two experts perhaps could bring some reason and
rationality to the thing, because of the enormous cost.
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1

It's been a burdensome thing and it's not easy for M r . DeBr^j

2

to carry the battle, and it's been a very costly one

3

for him going forward, and a very costly process for

4

Prudential to defend.

5

this statute was amended to allow the customer the choice

6

of one thing or the other,the b a t t l e , to a large measure,

7

had been fairly won.

And I sort of think that once

But I don't think I have any choices

g

From all of my rambling, M r . DeBry, can

g

you draft an intelligent set of findings, conclusions

10

and whatever?

n

MR

12

THE C O U R T :

^

-

exceptions to my

EeBRY:

Yes.

Thank you.

Do you desire to make any further]

—

14

MR. DeBRY:

N o , your Honor.

15

THE C O U R T :

~

16

MR. DeBRY:

No.

17
18
19

|^

MR. PALMER:

my openness and candor?

W e l l , what I'm

suggesting

is that I expect that there will be an appeal before
we

<? et into the class issues, and I would anticipate

20

findings and a judgment be presently entered in favor

21

of M r . Madsen.

22

MR- DeBRY:

W e l l , perhaps that's a job

23

for another day.

We'll have to take your ruling and

24

think about it and decide.

25

what further steps are indicated.

We'll suggest to the Court

50 9-jVp>

tf'

1
2

THE COURT:

Would you submit that to

MR. DeBRY:

Yes.

THE COURT:

In advance, and allow me some

Mr. Palmer?

3

!

I

I

4

I have got a month-long trial set for October,

J
»
j
!
j

5

leeway.

6

and so I'm going to be locked in to that time-wise.

7

if you've got objections or whatever, if we can get hearings

And

i

i

8

early in the morning or late in the afternoon, I 1 11 certainly

9

be able to accommodate those kinds of things.

10

The reporter gets to go home at 5:00 on

11

usual business, though I'll note for the record that

12

it 1 s now 5:58.

13 I
14

MR. DeBRY:

We thank the Court and staff

for your attention and the courtesies extended.

15

THE COURT:

It's been a stimulating and

16

challenging experience, but it really is not a very easy

17

process, because it seems to me that the Court is in

18

a position that clearly,in a case like that, you can't

19

help but be damned if you do and damned if you don't,

20

in either respect.

21

a case.

22

And it's not a half-a-loaf kind of

I realize that taking the lower figure

23

of Mr. Stewart may appear to be that way, but I recognize

24

that there are some reasonable areas that you could criticize

25

maybe some of the assumptions he made, as well as those

siaO
\>

of Mr. Norman.
2 I

We 1 11 be i n

3

[Evening r e c e s s

4

recess.
commencing a t 5:58

p.m.]

-ooOoo-

5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Salt Lake City, Utah

JAN 16 1986
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife, for
themselves and all others
similarly situated,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

226073

vs.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself
and all others similarly
situated,
Defendant.

This case comes before the Court as a class action brought
by plaintiffs seeking to have Judgment against the defendant
Prudential for interest on money held by Prudential in reserve
accounts.
The case was tried before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup,
District Judge, sitting without a jury.

At the conclusion of

the evidence and arguments of counsel, Judge Rigtrup commented
from the bench on several subjects, and indicated his decision
based upon the law and evidence.
Prior to the signing and filing of Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Judgment, the defendant Prudential moved to have
Judge Rigtrup disqualified.

Thereafter, the issue of Judge

Rigtrup1s disqualification was referred to this division of
the Court for resolution.

PAGE TWO

*ADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The plaintiffs have raised the issue of timeliness, claiming
that defense counsel did not raise his objection to Judge Rigtrup
bearing the case in a timely fashion.

In reviewing the transcript

Df the proceedings before Judge Rigtrup on September 5, 1985,
it is clear that Judge Rigtrup was about to rule, and that when
Judge Rigtrup made his statements about being a former borrower
of Prudential that insufficient notice was given to Prudential's
counsel of this fact to allow counsel to confer with his client
to determine the appropriate course of action.
The filing of an Affidavit of Prejudice against the judge
Before whom the client and attorney have a case pending is a
serious matter and not one to be undertaken lightly, or without
the client and the attorney conferring.

In reviewing the transcript,

this Court concludes that counsel for the defendant could not
De. expected to interrupt the proceedings to file an Affidavit
3f Prejudice.

Therefore, the argument that the objection was

lot timely is without merit.
The next issue that must be addressed is whether the Judge
In question was biased and prejudiced within the meaning of
*ule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Utah Supreme

:ourt in Haslam v. Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948)
aeld that actual bias and prejudice on the part of a judge disjualifies that judge.

The court stated:

KADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Bias and prejudice means a hostile feeling
or spirit of ill will toward one of the
litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism
toward one* The fact that a judge may have
an opinion as to the merits of the cause
or that he has strong feelings about the
type of litigation involved does not make
him biased or prejudiced.
L13 Utah at 20
There have been no subsequent cases cited to this Court
concerning the meaning of the term "biased and prejudiced."
This Court notes, however, that subsequent to Haslam, supra,
Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted by
the Supreme Court of this state.

More importantly, in 1974

the Utah Supreme Court approved the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Canon 3(c) provides that a judge should disqualify himself in
a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned*
This Court concludes that the impartiality of Judge Rigtrup
might be reasonably questioned, and therefore Judge Rigtrup
should have disqualified himself from hearing the issues raised
in this case.
It is disputed as to whether or not Judge Rigtrup would
be a member of a potential class of individuals who may or may
not have causes of action against Prudential.

Although Judge

Rigtrup is not a party to this litigation, it is conceivable
that his rulings could be binding upon Prudential in other similar
litigation in which Judge Rigtrup could be a plaintiff on a

MADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL
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theory of collateral estoppel. He may therefore have a financial
interest which would be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding as defined under Canon 3(c)(1)(c).
The litigants in this action have raised the issue of remittal
of disqualification as defined under Canon 3(d).

The Court

has reviewed the Affidavits on file, which are conflicting.
A remittal of disqualification is in effect an affirmative defense
to the Motion to Disqualify a sitting judge.

In reviewing the

record, the Court can find nothing which persuades it by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a remittal of the disqualification.
The Court concludes that the overwhelming weight of authority
is that the disqualification should be retroactive, and this
Court so holds.
Lastly, this Court points out the advice of Justice Wade
in Haslam, supra:
One of the most important things in government
is that all persons subject to its jurisdiction
shall always be able to obtain a fair and
impartial trial in all matters of litigation
in its courts. It is nearly as important
that the people have absolute confidence
in the integrity of the courts. I can think
of nothing that would as surely bring the
courts into disrepute as for a judge to
insist on trying a case where one of the
litigants believes that such judge is biased
and prejudiced against him.
113 Utah at 25.

MADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL
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Since no Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Judgment
have been entered in this case, and Judge Rigtrup has been disqualified, a new trial will be held before a Judge to whom the
case will be assigned.

This assignment will be made known to

the lawyers and litigants by way of a Minute Entry which will
u*y

follow shortly.
Dated this

vu

dav of January, 1986.

PHILIP. R. FISHLER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

u

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK

By ... K CM&£zAQ£.
Deputy ClerK

Robert J. Debry
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34107
Telephone: (301) 262-3915
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAL^ LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
•

•

*

RICHARD MADSSN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife, for themselves and all others similarly situated,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
Civil Nos. 225073 4 793404

vs.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself
and all others similarly
situated,

Judge Philip R. Fishle:

Defendant,
UTAH 3ANKERS ASSOCIATION.
*

•

•

Prudential Federal Savings & Loan's Motion to Disquaii:
the Honorable Kenneth R. Rigtrup, having come on for hearing, th:
Court having heard evidence, considered the memoranda on file, a:
being fully advised of the premisis, it is hereby ordered, ad^ud-:
and decreed that Judge Rigtrup be and he is hereby disqualified;
And further that all prior rulings of Judge Rigtrup be
and the same are hereby set aside on the ground and for the reas:
that although there is no actual bias on the part of Judge Rigtr:.

-here is an appearance of bias as set forth in the y.e-cra.-.iuDecision heretofore filed bv this Court.

DATED this 2*^

day of /j?^****—!

, 1 S35

BY THE COURT:

0rdjL.
5

hilip i. Fishier
District Judge (Presicing!

-2-
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f, 3 , K , r 7 7
H. SftR'.-Mf, EtANS. CLERK

i i j i 2i5T COURT

,

y

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUf>f6i£i?^DlSTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo——
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-

ORDER

PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,

Civil No. 226073

Defendant.
oooOooo
The motion of the named plaintiffs for a determination
that this action be maintained as a class action having come on
to be heard, and the same having been duly considered by the
Court after presentation of briefs and oral arguments by the
parties,
IT IS ORDERED, that the motion be and is hereby
granted, and that this action shall be maintained as a class
action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23(a) and 23(b) (I) (A)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the class represented by
the named plaintiffs be and it is hereby certified as all persons
who are presently parties to trust deed contracts with defendant
wherein the contract provides that:
"In addition to the monthly payments as
provided in said note, the trustor agrees
to pay to the beneficiary, upon the same
day each month, budget payments estimated
to equal one-twelfth of the annual taxes
and insurance premiums? said budget payments to be adjusted from time to time as
required, and said budget payments are
hereby pledged to the beneficiary as
additional security for the full performance
of this deed of trust and the note secured
thereby. The budget payments so accumulated
may be withdrawn by the beneficiary for the
payment of taxes or insurance premiums due
/4

JO

« />

on the premises. The beneficiary may at
any time, without notice, apply said budget
payments to the payments of any sums due
under the terms of this deed of trust and
the note secured hereby or either of them.
Trustors failure to pay said budget payments
shall constitute a default under this trust."
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that this class is maintained
for the purpose of further proceedings to determine whether or
not profits were derived from the use of the "budget payments"
and, if so, to require an accounting for them to the plaintiffs.
The maintenance of the class action shall be conditional upon
the determination after a trial upon the merits that the
defendant, by the use, if any, of the funds in plaintiffs'
reserve account derived a profit from such use for which it
must account to plaintiffs under the decision of the Supreme
Court of Utah filed January 14, 1977 in this case.
DATED this / 3

day of July, 1977.
BY THE COURT:

,4..,, ?// ri^h

...-"S&Z
^
ST ^^^^^^osx**

v

Bryant' vu Croft"
"—
District Court Judge

/

CERTIFICATE OF_SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order for the Judge's signature was served upon
Joseph J. Palmer, Esq., attorney for defendant,- 600 Deseret Plaza
15 East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, by U. S. mail,

postage prepaid, this 7th day of July, 1977.
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MORTGAGE
Turn Moeroao* made this
huadndaad fifty-€ir;ht

3rd

day of

«**l7

between
Kenneth WLgtrup, aa uxamrried nee

of
Salt U k e
, County of
S a l t Wke
Mortgagor, aad
PRUDSfTIaL FEDERAL UVIKGS AHD LOU! ASSOCIATO*

t ejrfflta*efTTah,

a corporation otgmaised aad existing under the laws of the Qnlted S t a t e s o f i a t r i c a
WmrBaia: THAT Wsnoaas, the Mortgagor is indebted to the Mortgages»the yiieaiBil eoei of
SLE-rSH THOUSIKD MINE HD5DRED AMD NO/100
-Deflaiefl 11,000.00
).m
evidenced by a prniiiiamrjr note, bearing even date herewith, for the payment of arid principal sua, with interest
thereon at the rate of four three fourth*
per eentua {U-3/k%) per ananm nutd paid; both principal
mini aad the interest thereon being payable a monthly instsflaous at the times and a the aaounei as eat forth.
in mid promissory note, iiietuae to whkh » here made, at the office of the Mortgagee a S a l t Lake
or at each other piece as the bolder may designers m writmc dlefivered or mailed to the Mortgagor, the i
mstaOment, if not sooner paid, to be o^aadpeyahtooathenrstdsy of
Nov TaxazfOBs, for the pexpost of acuring prompt payment of aid sole, the Mnrtaejnr, far rainsas
consideration, receipt of whkh it hereby scsmowkdged, doa hereby ™—+f«fj». eoavey, asaga, sad wane* asto the
Mortgagee, the foflowardeseribed property, situated in
S a l t Tr^frt
County of
Salt T -*^
, aad State of Utah:
Lot 2 8 , Eaet Hlllbrook Subdivision, according t o the plat thereof, recorded
in the o f f i c e of the County Recorder of said County.

together with all water rights, rights of way, easementa, tenements, lamditsaents and HUHIIUIMSIHIS thereunto
iicioriiong, or in anywwe now or hereafter appertaining and ail rrnta, issues and profits thereof (provided, how<*v<*r,
rb»t the Mortgagor nhail be entitled to ooUeet and retain the said rents, issue* and profits until default hereunder),
ui.l ail tixtun*^ oow or hereafter attache*i to or used in connection with the premias henna described; and in addition
:her*"o th.- .* .liuwing d*»wcribed household appliances, which are, and shall be deemed to be,fixturesand a part of
f ivr realty, &n*i an* a poruon of the security for the uutebtednes* herein mentioned:

The Mortgagor covenant* and agrees with the Mortgage* as follows:
1. He- will promptly pay the principal of and interest on. the indebtedness evidenced by thii said note, at tba^
timet and in the «*»ww» therein provided. Privilege is 4tamed to prepay at any tone, without pieuiima or fan,
the enure indebtedness or any part thereof not leaf than the amount of one installment, or one Uuiklierf'JDrattr1
^$100.00), whichever is less.
2. Tofrthcr with, and in addition to, the monthly payments of prmrir-d and interest payable under the terms
of the note secured hereby, the Mortgagor wul pay to the Mortgagee, on the first day of each s n a t h until the said
note 1* fullv paid:
(a) A sum equal to the ground rents, if any, next due, pins the premiums that will next become due and payable
on policjCT of fire and other hazard insurance covering the mortgaged property, plus taxes and sawanwnents
next due on the aicrtcaeed property (all as estimated by the Mortgagee, and ci which the Mortgagor
is notified) less all sum* already paid therefor divided by the number of months to elapse before one
month prior to the date when such ground rents, premiums, taxes and aesessments will \
such mms to be held by Mortgagee in trust to pay said ground rents, pi "
before the same become delinquent.
(b) The aggregate of the amounts payable pnrsnant to subparagraph (a) and those payable on the note secured
hereby, shall be paid in a smgfc payment each month, to be applied-to the following items in the order
stated:
(1) pound rent*, taxes, assessments, fire sad other hazard insurance premiums;
(u; intern* on the indebtedness 5reun.1l hereby; and
(ii!) amortization of the principal of said indebtedness.
Any deficiency in the amount of any audi aggregate monthly payment shall, unless made gpoo by the
Mortgagor prior to the due date of the next such payment, constitute an event of default under this
mortgage. At Mortgagee's option, Mortgagor will pay a "lata charge" not exceeding (bar per
centum (4%) of any installment when pawl more than fifteen (15) days after the duo data thereof
to cover the c^tm expense involved in handling delinquent payments, but such "lata charge" shall
not be payable out of the proceeds of any sale made to satisfy the indebtedness secured hereby,
unless such proceeds ore sufficient to discharge the entire indebtedness and all proper costs sad
expeiiae* secured thereby.
3. If the total of the payments made by the Mortgagor under (a) of paragraph 2 preceding shall exceed the
amount o( payment* actually made by the Mortgagee for ground rents, taxes and saaessmeats, or msuranee premiums,
at* the cane may be, men excess -hail he credited on subsequent payments to be made by the Mortgagor for such
items, if, however, such montldy payments shall not be sufficient to pay such items when the name shall become
due and payable, then the Mortgagor shall pay to the Mortgage* any amount ne*ea*ar> to make up the deficiency
within thirty (30* da\a after written notice from the Mortgagee stating the amount of the deficiency, which notice
mav be given by mail. If at any tune the Mortgagor shall tender to the Mortgagee, in accordance with the provsaons
o( the note secured liereiiy, full payment of the entire indebtedness represented thereby, the Mortgagee shall, in
computing the amount of *uch indebtedness, credit to the account of the Mortgagor any credit ^ « " * » accumulated
under the proviMiomt of ia) of paragraph 2 hereof. If the-e shall he a default under any of the provuaona of this
ruoritf&gc resulting in a public sale of the premises covered hereby, or if the Mortgages acquires the property otherwise
u:ter default, the Mortgagee -hail apply, at the time of the commencement of such proceedings, or at the time the
rtrtifjcrrv is otherwise acquired, the amount then remaining to the credit of Mortgagor under (a) of paragraph 2
;;n*ceding. as a credit on tin* interest accrued and unpaid and the balance to the principal then remaining unpaid
on said note.
4 Hie ii-n of rhi« instrument • hnll remain m full force and effect during say postponement or extension of the
•irne ..{ pa-. :u««nt of the mdcUt due* or any part thereof secured hereby.
M,rz..iL'>r is l.-.w:*ull\ sized of -aui premises in fee simple (or such other estate as is stated herein), and has
± «-t
. . !•»• .i nisrir t » ruortmiKf «••{!. and ciiave\ the iame, and will warrant and defend the same against ail
>:iutM' "Imu^i . w l ut,:mfK.'-> what-w.cr. litis mortgage is a
lien on said property.
IT

M I |»:»\ .*" :::*'iitid rent* ta.te*. u-wswrnenta. water rates, and other rovernmentai or municipal chance*.
•*
fin vud prvmi«--* except when pavment for all such items hs* theretofore been uuuic
• ti 1 •

,.. 1

J
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7. Mortgagor shall not commit or permit waste; sad shall ™«;w»«i«t the property ia a* good condition a* at
preaeat, rraannshle wear aad tear excepted. Upon aay failure to so "•»*'•••, Mortgagee, ** xta option may eaass
reasonable maintenance work to be performed at the cost ot Mortgagor.
S. Mortgagor will continuously mainftiin hazard insurance, of such type or types and tawxmts a* Mortgagee
may from time to time require, oa the improvements now or hereafter oo said premises, aad except when payment
for all such premiums has theretofore been made under (a) of paragraph 2 hereof, he will pay promptly when due
say premiums therefor. All insurance shall be carried ia companies approved by the Mortgagee aad the policies
and renewals thereof shall be held by it and hare attached thereto loss payable dausea ia favor of aad ia form
acceptable tc the Mortgagee. Ia eveat o( loss he will give immediate notice by mail to the Mortgagee, who may
make proof offoesif not made promptly by the Mortgagor. Each insurance company ajuceraed is hereby authorised
and directed to make payment for such loss directly to the Mortgagee instead of to the Mortgagor aad the Mortesauojoiatly. The ins. ranee proceeds, or aay part thereof, may be applied by the Mortgage*, at its option, either to the
reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair of the pruuerty <*«—«f* In event of
foreclosure o( this mortgage, or other transfer of title to the mortgaged property in extiagusmmeat of the debt
secured hereby, all right, title and interest of the Mortgagor ia aad to aay insurance policies then ia fores shall
pass to the purchaser or grantee.
9. Mortgagee may perform any defaulted covenant or agrimrnsnl of Mortgagor to smm extent so Mortgagee
shall determine, and any moaeya advanced by Mortgagee for such purpose* shall bear interest at the rats provided for in the principal indebtedness, shall thereupon become a part of the mdebtedures second by tea*
instrument, ratably and on a parity with all other indebtedness secured therebyr and aboil be payable thirty
(30) days after demand.
10. Upon the request of the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor anafl execute and defirer a supplier! sntei note or
notes for the sum or sums advanced by the Mortgagee for the alteration, mpdarnissrion or improvement mods
at the Mortgagor's request; or for maintenance of said premises or taxes or assessments against the same and
for any other purpose elsewhere authorised hereunder. Said note or uttessbjUl be secured hereby on a parity
with and as folly as if the advance evidenced thereby were included m the note first lisarrihiid abort, Said
supplemental note or notes shall bear interest at the rate provided for in the principal musbtadneaa and shall
bo payable in approximately equal monthly peymenta.far^«ch period an may be agreed anon by the creditor
and debtor. Failing to agree on the maturity, the whole of the sum or sums so advanced snail be duo aad
payable thirty (30) days after demand by the creditor. Ia no eront shall the maturity extend beyond too
ultinaate maturity of the note first described above.
11. Upon a default in the payment of any HirisriHtrni— hereby secured or m the performs nee of any of the
terms or conditions hereof, the Mortgagee may dseasre the entire fnonbteesea* due aad faremlnss this mortgage
aad may eater upon the property, eofleet all rente, besoms, aad prate thereof.
12. If smt is brought to enforce the coOection of the debt secured hereby, the court may appoint a issaUsr of
the mortgaged premises pending foreclosure aad redemption.
IX Mortgagor will pay all costs, aad expenses, including rpssonshle attorneys fees, i asanashfr iaeurred by
the Mortgagee, because of the failure on the part of the Mortgagor to perform his obligation under said ptnmissnry
note and this mortgage, or either.
14. If the indebtedness ssanred hereby be guaranteed or insured under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act,
as amended, such Act and Regulations issued thereunder aad ia effect on the date hereof shall govern the rights,
duties and liabilities of the parties hereto, and any provisions of this or other instruments executed in connection
with said indebtedness which are inconsistent with said Act or Regulations are hereby amended to conform thereto.
The covenants herein contained shall bind, aad the benefits sad advantages shall inure to, the respective heirs,
executors, administrator*, sunausurs aad assigns of the parties hereto. Whenever used, the singular number shall
include the plural, the plural the singular, the use of say gender shall include all genders, and the term "Mortgagee" shall include any payee of the indebtedness hereby secured or aay transferee thereof whether by operation
of law or otherwise.

WITNESS the hand

Signed in the presence of—

and seal

of the Mortgagor

the day and yearfirstabove written.

: . U . ™ i - ^ ^ - . - W i . T . ^Jl
aanrjoth Rigtrm* ,

152? ~d64
STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY OF

Salt U K «

J

On the
2T*i
<**? °f
July
c=e
.Ker.net.% ?.igtr-ip, an u n n a r r i e d nan
above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me thai
he

, A. D. 19 58 , peaon&Qy appeared before
, the «cner(s) of tot
executed the same.

My commtaaon expirvs
Salt Lake City. Utah
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Section 13. [Judicial Conduct Commission J
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established
which shall investigate and conduct confidential
hearings regarding complaints against any justice or
judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the
Judicial Conduct Commission may order the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary
retirement of any justice or judge for the following:
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in
office;
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a
felony under state or federal law;
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform
judicial duties;
(4) disability that seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties; or
(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.
Prior to the implementation of any commission
order, the supreme court shall review the commission's proceedings as to both law and fact. The court
may also permit the introduction of additional
evidence. After its review, the supreme court shall,
as it finds just and proper, issue its order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the commission's
order. The legislature by statute shall provide for
the composition and procedures of the Judicial
Conduct Commission.

78*7-1, Disqualification for interest or relation to
parties.
Except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge
or justice of the peace shall sit or act as such in any
action or proceeding:
(1) To which he is a party, or in which he is interested.
(2) When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, computed
according to the rules of the common law.
(3) When he has been attorney or counsel for
either party in the action or proceeding.
But the provisions of this section shall not apply
to the arrangement of the calendar or the regulation
of the order of business, nor to the power of transferring the action or proceeding to some other
court.

Exhibit

Rule 63. Disability or Disqualification of a Judge,
(a) Disability If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge
before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be
performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or findings
of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly sitting
in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform those
duties, but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those duties
because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may in his
discretion grant a new trial.
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice,
either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to
the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in another
judge to hear and determine the matter
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known If the judge against
whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall
enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another
judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which
judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit If the judge
against whom the affidavit is directed does not question the legal sufficiency
of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds that it
is legally sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the case or determine
the matter in question. No party shall be entitled m any case to file more than
one affidavit, and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a
certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are made m
good faith

•'i-:;.
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Joseph J. Palmer (#250&)^ftdV**
Reid E. Lewis (#1951), ^ *
^
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-0250

Zup.'K

Attorneys for Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife, for themselves and all others similarly situated,

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN A. ADAMS

Plaintiffs,

vs.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &

Civil No. 226073
("Madsen I")

LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself

and all others similarly
situated,
Defendant.
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION.

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

John A. Adams, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am Senior Vice President of Prudential Federal

Savings & Loan Association, the defendant in this action.

Exhibit

2.

This action was tried by the Honorable Kenneth

Rigtrup on September 4, 5 and 6, 1985.

I was present in court

each day of the trial.
3.

I was present in court on Friday, September 6,

1985, when Judge Rigtrup, immediately after the close of the
trial, made the remarks set forth in paragraph 12 of the
Affidavit of Disqualification.
4.

The conversation described in paragraph 12 of the

Affidavit of Disqualification, and in Exhibit No. 1 of the
Affidavit, accurately reflects the statements made by Judge
Rigtrup and by Joseph Palmer during the proceedings.
5.

Until I heard Judge Rigtrup's statements in court

on September 6, 1985, I had never been told by anyone nor did I
know that Judge Rigtrup had a mortgage with Prudential.
6.
Prudential.

I have access to the mortgage files maintained by
There are approximately in excess of 18,000

mortgages now held by Prudential.
7.

After hearing Judge Rigtrupfs comments, I

researched the Prudential records and found the mortgage file
for him.

The mortgage instrument between Judge Rigtrup and

Prudential was originally executed on July 3, 1958.

rt

required Judge Rigtrup to pay funds each month into a reserve
account.

The underlying loan was completely paid by Judge

Rigtrup on approximately December 14, 1983.
DATED this

1*1 V

day of October, 1985.

/udhn
-2-

A. Adams

day of October, 1985, personally .
.. appearedIpefore me John A. Adams, the signer of the Affidavit
/, who d,uly\ acknowledged to me that he executed it.
,'•;• M

..'"On this

Residing in: ^ f
My'^Gominission Expires:

-3-

^ j ^ (fly

^

^

Salt Lak® City, ytarv

rn.e»wciCTK;soFnc8

JAN 16 1986
H. Dixon Hi

list. Court

DEC 26

4 3a PH '95

IN THE THIRD J l f t f t m r
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY MADSEN, his )
wife, for themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, for itself
and all
others similarly situated,
Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN T. HARD
Civil No 226073

UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION
Stephen T. Hard, being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am an associate attorney in the law firm of

Giauq-ue & Williams.
2.

From approximately December, 1980 to July, 1983,

Richard W. Giauque and I were counsel of record for Western
Savings & Loan Company in the matters of Everill v. Western
Savings & Loan Company, Civil No. 79-701, ("Everill") and Petty
v. Western Savings & Loan Company, Civil No. 79-700 ("Petty").
3.

A number of the "interest-on-reserve account"

cases, including the Everill and Petty cases, were consolidated
before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup.

Exhibit.

CT

4.

I recall that at some point in the proceedings

over which he presided, Judge Rigtrup indicated that he had an
old, low-interest mortgage loan which contained a reserve
account clause.

He further indicated that he would be able to

rule objectively in these matters despite that fact,

I recall

that he asked if anyone had any objections to his sitting on
these cases.

I do not recollect anyone so objecting.

DATED this StCrfJ) day of December, 1985.

^tfepiren T. Hard

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

On this £>o^ day of December, 1985, personally appeared
before me Stephen T. Hard, the signer of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

"TCgSegwz^g-oe^O
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: ?&£.,

My Commission Expires:
O 0*

0586p

-2-

SSZ^OLJ'.

CERTIFICATE OF MAffcfNfi
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN T. HARD (Madsen vs. Prudential Utah Bankers Association)
was MAILED, U.S. MAIL, .pQ5"fragG pi'tpaid, this **t?
1985, to the following:

Joseph J. Palmer, Esq.
Reid E. Lewis
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Peter W. Billings
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

day of

/>>. t—
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CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Approved by the Supreme Court of Utahf March 1, 1974
CANON 1

A Judge Should Uphold
the Integrity
and
Independence
of the Judiciary
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice
in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining,
and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct
so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.
The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further
that objective.
CANON 2

A Judge Should Avoid
Impropriety
and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All His Activities
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to
influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the
prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor
should he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify
voluntarily as a character witness.
CANON 3

A Judge Should
Perform
the Duties of His Office
Impartially
and Diligently
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other
activities. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed
by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply:
A. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence in it. He should be unswayed by partisan interests,
public clamor, or fear of criticism.
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before
him.
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his
official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers,
and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction
and control.

(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested
in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to
law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider
ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending
proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him
if he gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the
substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or
impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to his direction
and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making
public statements in the course of their official duties or from
explaining for public information the procedures of the court.
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto
during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that
a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes
of judicial administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of
appropriate court proceedings.
B. Administrative Responsibilities
(1) A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and
facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilites of
other judges and court officials.
(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his
direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to him.
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may become aware.
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should
exercise his power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. He should not approve compensation
of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.
C. Disqualification.
^^^^
(1) A judge shmiiri(ftisq^fl|ifY jn'nnsjpTf)iTi a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with
whom he previously practiced law served during such association
as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer
has been a material witness concerning it;
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest
in the subject matter in controversy or in a pajrty to the proceeding, or any other interest that could bergubsteiffiaiiy arfetrtet^-by the outcome of the proceeding;
~~^
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person;
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee
of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in
the proceeding;
(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself
about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law
system;
(b) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator,
trustee, and guardian;
(c) "financial interegiii-aieans ownership of a legal or equitable interest, ^ ^ g ^ ^ ^ ^ v or a relationship as director, advisor, or
other aoiVGrparncipant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that
holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities
unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;
(ii) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal,
or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities
held by the organization;
(iii) the proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest"
in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding
could substantially affect the value of the interest;
(iv) ownership of government securities is a "financial interest"
in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could
substantially affect the value of the securities.
D. Remittal of Disqualification.
A judge may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose
on the record the basis of his disrmaiifiVaHrm Tf KQC^ ^« ™~u ^~

closure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree that the judge's relationship is immaterial or that his
financial "interest is insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified,
and may participate in the proceeding.

CANON 4
A Judge May Engage in
Activities to Improve the Law,
the Legal System, and
the Administration
of Justice
A judge, subject to the proper performance of his judicial duties, may
engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in doing so he does not
cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come
before him:
A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activities
concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.
B. He may appear at a public hearing before
body or official on matters concerning the
the administration of justice, and he may
executive or legislative body or official, but
the administration of justice.

an executive or legislative
law, the legal system, and
otherwise consult with an
only on matters concerning

C. He may serve as a member, officer, or director of an organization or
governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice. He may assist such an organization in raising funds and may participate in their management and
investment, but should not personally participate in public fund raising
activities. He may make recommendations to public and private fundgranting agencies on projects and programs concerning the law, the
legal system, and the administration of justice.

CANON 5
A Judge Should
Regulate
His Extra-Judicial
Activities
to Minimize the Risk of
Conflict with His Judicial Duties
A. Avocational Activities. A judge may write, lecture, teach, and speak
on non-legal subjects, and engage in the arts, sports, and other social
and recreational activities, if such avocational activities do not detract
from the dignity of his office or interfere with the performance of his
judicial duties.
B. Civic and Charitable Activities. A judge may participate in civic and
charitable activities that do not reflect adversely upon his impartiality
or interfere with the performance of his judicial duties. A judge may
serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization not conducted
for the economic or political advantage of its members, subject to the
following limitations:

(1) A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be
engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him or
will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.
(2) A judge should not solicit funds for any educational, religious,
charitable, fraternal, or civic organization, or use or permit the use
of the prestige of his office for that purpose, but he may be listed
as an officer, director, or trustee of such an organization. He should
not be a speaker or the guest of honor at an organization's fund raising events, but he may attend such events.
(3) A judge should not give investment advice to such an organization,
but he may serve on its board of directors or trustees even though it
has the responsibility for approving investment decisions.
C. Financial Activities.
(1) A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that
tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality, interfere with the
proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial position, or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons
likely to come before the court on which he serves.
(2) Subject to the requirements of subsection (1), a judge may hold
and manage investments, including real estate, and engage in other
remunerative activity.
(3) A judge should manage his investments and other financial interests
to minimize the number of cases in which he is disqualified. As soon
as he can do so without serious financial detriment, he should divest
himself of investments and other financial interests that might require frequent disqualification.
(4) Neither a judge nor a member of his family residing in his household
should accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone except as
follows:
(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to a public testimonial to him;
books supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official
use; or an invitation to the judge and his spouse to attend a barrelated function or activity devoted to the improvement of the
law, the legal system, or the administration of justice;
(b) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may
accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, bequest, favor, or loan
from a relative; a wedding or engagement gift; a loan from a
lending institution in its regular course of business on the same
terms generally available to persons who are not judges; or a
scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms applied to
other applicants;
(c) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may
accept any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor
is not a party or other person whose interests have come or are
likely to come before him.
(5) For the purposes of this section "member of his family residing in
his household" means any relative of a judge by blood or marriage,
or a person treated by a judge as a member of his family, who resides
in his hnm^hfilri

(6) Information acquired by a judge in his judicial capacity should not
be used or disclosed by him in financial dealings or for any other
purpose not related to his judicial duties.
D. Fiduciary Activities. A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust,
or person of a member of his family, and then only if such service will
not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. "Member of his family'' includes a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a
close familial relationship. As a family fiduciary a judge is subject to
the following restrictions:
(1) He should not serve if it is likely that as a fiduciary he will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him, or if
the estate, trust, or ward becomes involved in adversary proceedings
in the court on which he serves or one under its appellate jurisdiction.
(2) While acting as a fiduciary a judge is subject to the same restrictions
on financial activities that apply to him in his personal capacity.
E. Practice of Law. A judge should not practice law.
F. Extra-judicial Appointments. A judge should not accept appointment to
a governmental committee, commission, or other position that is concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. A
judge, however, may represent his country, state, or locality on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, and cultural activities.

CANON 6
Compensation Received for Quasi-Judicial
and Extra-Judicial
Activities
A judge may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses for
the quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code, if the
source of such payments does not give the appearance of influencing the
judge in his judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety,
subject to the following restrictions:
A. Compensation. Compensation should not exceed a reasonable amount nor
should it exceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the
same activity.
B. Expense Reimbursement. Expense reimbursement should be limited to
the actual cost of travel, food, and lodging reasonably incurred by the
judge and, where appropriate to the occasion, by his spouse. Any payment
in excess of such an amount is compensation.

CANON 7
A Judge Should Refrain from
Political Activity
Inappropriate
to His Judicial Office
A. Political Conduct in General.
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office should not:
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization;
(b) make speeches for a political organization or candidate or publicly
endorse a candidate for public office;
(c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment or make a contribution to a
political organization or candidate, attend political gatherings, or
purchase tickets for political party dinners, or other functions,
except as authorized in subsection A(2);
(2) A judge holding an office filled by public election between competing
candidates, or a candidate for such office, may, only insofar as permitted by law, attend political gatherings, speak to such gatherings on
Jiis own behalf when he is a candidate for election or re-election,
identify himself as a member of a political party, and contribute to
a political party or organization.
(3) A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate either
in a party primary or in a general election for a non-judicial office,
except that he may continue to hold his judicial office while being a
candidate for election to or serving as a delegate in a state constitutional convention, if he is otherwise permitted by law to do so.
(4) A judge should not engage in any other political activity except on
behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice.
B. Campaign Conduct.
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that
is filled either by public election between competing candidates or on
the basis of a merit system election:
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, and
should encourage members of his family to adhere to the same
standards of political conduct that apply to him;
(b) should prohibit public officials or employees subject to his direction or control from doing for him what he is prohibited from
doing under this Canon; and except to the extent authorized
under subsection B(2) or B{3), he should not allow any other
person to do for him what he is prohibited from doing under
this Canon;
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues;
or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or
other fact.

(2) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that
is filled by public election between competing candidates should not
himself solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated
support, but he may establish committees of responsible persons to
secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign and
to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions
and public support from lawyers. A candidate's committees may
solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than [90] days before a primary election and no later than [90] days after the last election in
which he participates during the election year. A candidate should
not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private
henefit of himself or members of his family.
(3) An incumbent judge who is a candidate for retention in or re-election
to office without a competing candidate, and whose candidacy has
drawn active opposition, may campaign in response thereto and may
obtain publicly stated support and campaign funds in the manner
provided in subsection B(2).
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AETNA LIFE INSURANCE
CO., Appellant
v.
Margaret W, LAVOIE and Roger
J. Lavoie, Sr»
No. 84-1601.
April 22, 1986.
Action was brought charging health
insurer with bad faith refusal to pay claimo
After two remands, 374 So.2d 310, 405
So.2d 17, the Circuit Court, Mobile County,
Michael E. Zoghby, J., rendered judgment
on jury verdict for insured for compensatory and punitive damages, and insurer appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court, 410
So 2d 1060, affirmed, and insurer appealed.
The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger,
held that (1) Court had jurisdiction; (2)
Alabama Supreme Court Justice's general
frustration with insurance companies that
were dilatory in paying claims did not reveal bias requiring disqualification under
due process clause; (3) Justice's participation in case violated insurer's due process rights; (4) there was no basis for
concluding that other Justices were disqualified; and (5) appearance of justice
would be best served by vacating decision
and remanding for further proceedings.
Vacated and remanded.
Justice Brennan filed concurring opinion.
Justice Blackmun filed opinion concurring in judgment in which Justice Marshall
joined.
Justice Stevens did not participate.
1. Federal Courts <*»504
Supreme Court had jurisdiction over
question of whether Alabama Supreme
Court Justice's participation in case violated insurer's rights under due process
clause of Fourteenth Amendment [U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14], where Alabama Supreme Court's order denying recusal mo-

tions clearly demonstrated court reached
merits of insurer's constitutional challenge,
and insurer raised this issue as soon as it
discovered facts relating to Justice's state
actions against insurance companies alleging bad-faith failure to pay claims.
2. Judges <s»49U)
Only in most extreme cases of bias or
prejudice is disqualification of judge constitutionally required.
3. Constitutional Law e=»316
Alabama Supreme Court Justice's general frustration with insurance companies
that were dilatory in paying claims did not
reveal bias requiring disqualification under
due process clause [U.S.CoA. ConstAmend.
14].
4. Constitutional Law <s»316
Insurer's rights under due process
clause of Fourteenth Amendment [HS.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14] were violated by Justice's participation in action seeking punitive damages for insurer's alleged bad-faith
refusal to pay valid claim, where Justice, at
time he cast deciding vote and authored
court's opinion, had pending at least one
very similar bad faith refusal-to-pay lawsuit against an insurer in another state
court
5. Judges <&»42
While Alabama Supreme Court Justices might conceivably have had slight pecuniary interest in action against insurer
seeking punitive damages for bad-faith refusal to pay valid claim because of their
possible inclusion in other Justices' class
action against another insurer alleging bad
faith, that interest was not direct, personal,
substantial and pecuniary, as required to
disqualify such judges.
6. Federal Courts <s»513
Upon determining that Alabama Supreme Court Justice was disqualified from
participation in case, appearance of justice
would be best served by vacating decision
and remanding for further proceedings,
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Syllabus *
When appellant insurer refused to pay
the full amount of a hospital bill incurred
by appellees, they brought suit in an Alabama state court, seeking both payment of
the full amount and punitive damages for
appellant's alleged bad-faith refusal to pay
a valid claim. The jury awarded $3.5 million in punitive damages. The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed, 5-to-4, in a per
curiam opinion written by Justice Embry.
Appellant then filed an application for rehearing, and, before the application was
acted on, learned that while the case was
pending before the Alabama Supreme
Court, Justice Embry had filed two actions
in an Alabama court against insurance
companies alleging bad-faith failure to pay
claims and seeking punitive damages. One
of the actions was a class action on behalf
of all state employees insured under a
group plan by the Blue Cross-Blue Shield.
Appellant then filed motions challenging,
on due process grounds, Justice Embry's
participation in the per curiam decision
and his continued participation in considering the rehearing application, and also
alleging that all justices on the court
should recuse themselves because of their
interests as potential class members in the
Blue Cross suit The court denied these
motions, and also the rehearing application.
Subsequently, the Blue Cross suit was settled, and Justice Embry received $30,000
under that settlement
Held:
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the
question whether Justice Embry's partie-

ipation in this case violated appellant's
rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, where the Alabama Supreme Court's order denying the
recusal motions clearly demonstrated that
the court reached the merits of appellant's
constitutional challenge, and where appellant raised this issue as soon as it discovered the facts relating to Justice Embry's
personal lawsuits. P. 1584.
2. Appellant's allegations, on a general basis, of Justice Embry's bias and prejudice against insurance companies that were
dilatory in paying claims, were insufficient
to establish any constitutional violation.
Pp. 1584-1585.
3. The record, however, presents
more than mere allegations of bias and
prejudice, and supports the conclusion that
Justice Embry's participation in this case
violated appellant's due process rights. All
of the issues in this case were present in
his Blue Cross suit, and the very nature of
that suit placed in issue whether he would
have to establish that he was entitled to a
directed verdict on the underlying claims
that Blue Cross refused to pay before gaining punitive damages. Moreover, the affirmance in this case of the largest punitive
damages award ever issued in Alabama on
precisely the type of claim raised in the
Blue Cross suit "raised the stakes" for
Blue Cross in that suit to Justice Embry's
benefit Thus, his opinion for the Alabama
Supreme Court had the clear and immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his own
case. When he made the judgment in this
case, he acted as "a judge in his own case."
His interest in this case was "direct personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary," Ward
v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S: 57, 60,
93 S.Ct 80, 83, 34 LEd.2d 267 (1972), as
shown by the sum he received in settlement
of the Blue Cross suit Pp. 1585-1587.
4. There is no bask for concluding
that the justices of the Alabama Supreme

* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the

reader. Set United States v. Detroit Lumber Co.,
200 U.S. 321, 337. 26 S.O. 282. 287, 50 LEd.
499.

Theodore B. Olson, Washington, D.C.,
for appellant
Jack N. Goodman, Washington, D.C., for
appellees.
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Court other than Justice Embry were disqualified under the Due Process Clause.
While those justices might conceivably
have had a slight pecuniary interest in this
case because of their possible inclusion in
the Blue Cross class action, that interest
annot properly be characterized as "direct,
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary."
iny interest that they might have had
vhen they passed on the rehearing applicaion was highly speculative and contingent,
>ince at that time the trial court in the Blue
>08s suit had not even certified a class, let
alone awarded any class relief of a pecuniary nature. Pp. 1587-1588.
5. Because of Justice Embry's leading role in the decision under review, the
"appearance of justice" will best be served
by vacating the decision and remanding for
further proceedings. Pp. 1588-1589.
470 So.2d 1060 (Ala.1984), vacated and
remanded.
BURGER, CJ., delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and
O'CONNOR, JJ.f joined. BRENNAN, J.,
filed a concurring opinion. BLACKMUN,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined.
STEVENS, J.y took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the
opinion of the Court
The question presented is whether the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was violated when a justice of
the Alabama Supreme Court declined to
recuse himself from participation in that
court's consideration of this case.
I
This appeal arises out of litigation concerning an insurance policy issued by appellant covering appellees Margaret and
Roger Lavoie. In January 1977, Mrs. Lavoie was examined by her physician, Dr.
Douglas, because of various ailments.
Shortly thereafter, on Dr. Douglas' recom-

mendation, she was admitted to the Mobile
Infirmary Hospital, where she remained
for 23 days for a battery of tests.
After her discharge, the hospital forwarded the appropriate forms and medical
records along with a bill for $3,028.25 to
appellant's local office in Mobile, Alabama.
The local office refused to pay the entire
amount, tendering payment for only
$1,650.22. The local office also sent a letter to the national office, concluding that
the 23-day hospitalization was unnecessary
and that "[h]ospital records do not indicate
anything to the contrary," even though all
the hospital records had not yet been received. At one point, the national office
told the local office to continue denying the
request for full payment, but added that
"if they act like they are going to file suit,"
the file should be reviewed.
Appellees filed suit against appellant,
seeking both payment of the remainder of
their original claim and punitive damages
for the tort of bad faith refusal to pay a
valid claim. The trial court dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action .with respect to the bad faith counts. Appellees
appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court,
which remanded on the ground that it had
"not foreclosed the possibility of recovery
in tort for the bad faith refusal of an
insurer to pay legitimate benefits due under an insurance policy." Lavoie v. Aetna
Life & Casualty Co., 374 So.2d 310, 312
(1979). On remand, the trial court entered
judgment for appellees on the unpaid portion of their claim and granted summary
judgment for appellant on the bad faith
claim. The Alabama Supreme Court again
reversed, explaining that on that same day
it had "recognized the intentional tort of
bad faith in first party insurance-actions."
Lavoie v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 405
So.2d 17, 18 (1981) (citing Chavers v. National Security Fire & Casualty Co., 405
So.2d 1 (Ala.1981)). On remand, appellees'
bad faith claim was submitted to a jury.
The jury awarded $3.5 million in punitive
damages. The trial judge denied appellant s motion for judgment n.o.v. or, alternatively, for remittitur.
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The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed
the award in a 5-to-4 decision. 470 So.2d
1060 (1984). An unsigned per curiam
opinion expressed the view of five justices
that the evidence demonstrated that appellant had acted in bad faith. The court
interpreted its prior opinions as not requiring dismissal of a bad-faith-refusal-to-pay
claim even where a directed verdict against
the insurer on the underlying claim was
impossible. The opinion also clarified the
issue of whether a bad faith suit could be
maintained where the insurer had made a
partial payment of the underlying claim.
Although earlier opinions of the court had
refused to allow bad faith suits in such
circumstances, partial payment was not dispositive of the bad faith issue. The court
also rejected appellant's argument that the
punitive damages award was so excessive
that it must be set aside.
Chief Justice Torbert, joined by Justice
Beatty, dissented; Justice Maddox, joined
by Justice Shores, also dissented, concluding that the case was controlled by the
court's earlier decision in National Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So.2d
1357 (1982), because there was an arguable
reason for appellant's refusal to pay the
claim.
The court's opinion was released on December 7, 1984; on December 21, 1984,
appellant filed a timely application for rehearing. On February 14, 1985, before its
application had been acted on, appellant
learned that while the instant action was
pending before the Alabama Supreme
Court, Justice Embry, one of the five justices joining the per curiam opinion, had
filed two actions in the Circuit Court for
Jefferson County, Alabama, against insurance companies. Both of these actions alleged bad faith failure to pay a claim. One
suit arose out of Maryland Casualty Company's alleged failure to pay for the loss of
a valuable mink coat; the other suit, which
Justice Embry brought on behalf of himself and as a representative of a class of all
other Alabama state employees insured under a group plan by Blue Cross-Blue Shield

of Alabama (including, apparently, all justices of the Alabama Supreme Court), alleged willful and intentional failure to withhold payment on valid claims. Both suits
sought punitive damages.
On February 21,1985, appellant filed two
motions in the Alabama Supreme Court,
challenging Justice Embry's participation
in the court's December 7, 1984, decision
and his continued participation in considering appellant's application for rehearing.
The motion also alleged that all justices on
the court should recuse themselves because
of their interests as potential class members in Justice Embry's suit against Blue
Cross. On March 8, 1985, the court unanimously denied the recusal motions. The
brief order stated that each justice had
voted individually on the matter of whether
he should recuse himself and that each
justice had voted not to do so. At the same
time, by a 5-to-4 division, the court denied
appellant's motion for rehearing.
Chief Justice Torbert wrote separately,
explaining that although his views had not
been influenced by his possible membership
in the putative class alleged in Justice Embry's suit against Blue Cross, he was nonetheless notifying the Clerk of the court
where that suit was pending not to permit
him to be included in the alleged class.
Justice Maddox also wrote separately, taking similar action.
On March 20, 1985, appellant obtained a
copy of the transcript of Justice Embry's
deposition, taken on January 10, 1985, in
connection with his Blue Cross suit The
deposition revealed that Justice Embry had
authored the per curiam opinion in this
case over an 8- or 9-month period during
which his civil action against Blue Cross
was being prosecuted. Justice Embry also
stated that, during that period, he had received "leads" from people with regard to
his bad faith action against Blue Cross and
that he put them in touch with his attorney.
Finally, Justice Embry revealed frustration
with insurance companies. For example,
when asked if he had ever had any difficulty with processing claims, Justice Embry
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retorted: "[T]hat is a silly question.
years and years."

For

Appellant moved for leave to file a second application for rehearing based on the
deposition, but that motion was denied.
Appellant filed an appeal with this Court,
and Justice POWELL, as Circuit Justice,
granted appellant's application for a stay
of the judgment below pending this Court's
disposition of the appeal. Shortly thereafter, Justice Embry's suit against Blue
Cross was settled by stipulation of the parties.1 In the stipulation, Blue Cross recognized "that some problems have occurred
in the past and is determined to minimize
them in the future." Justice Embry received $30,000 under the settlement agreement on a basic compensatory claim of
unspecified amount; a check for that sum
was deposited by his attorney directly into
Justice Embry's personal account.
We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction pending argument on
the merits. 471 U.S.
, 105 S.Ct. 2672,
86 LEd.2d 691 (1985). We now vacate and
remand.
II
[1] We are satisfied as to the Court's
jurisdiction over the question of whether
Justice Embry's participation violated appellant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Appellees argue that the Alabama Supreme Court did not reach this
issue because it was raised only after the
court's decision on the merits. We reject
that contention as at odds with the record.
On March 8, 1985, the court entered the
following order:
"Upon consideration, the Court is of
the opinion that under the allegation of
said motion in this case each justice
should vote individually on the matter of
whether or not he or she is disqualified
and should recuse Each justice having
voted not to recuse,
1. Justice Embry's suit against Maryland Casualty Comoaiw had been settled sometime earlier

"IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED
that the 'Motion for Disqualification and
Motion for Withdrawal of Opinion of December 7, 1984, and for Hearing De
Novo' be . . . denied." App. to Juris.
Statement 64a.
This order clearly demonstrates that the
Alabama court reached the merits of appellant's constitutional challenge, albeit on a
justice-by-justice basis. Moreover, appellant raised this issue as soon as it discovered the facts relating to Justice Embry's
personal lawsuits. On this record, we conclude jurisdiction is proper. See Ulster
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 147154, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2219-2223, 60 L.Ed.2d
777 (1979); Ward v. Village of Monroemile, 409 U.S. 57, 61, 93 S.Ct. 80, 83, 34
L.Ed.2d 267 (1972).
Ill
A
Appellant contends Justice Embry's general hostility towards insurance companies
that were dilatory in paying claims, as expressed in his deposition, requires a conclusion that the Due Process Clause was violated by his participation in the disposition
of this case. The Court has recognized
that not "[a]ll questions of judicial qualification . . . involve constitutional validity.
Thus matters of kinship, personal bias,
state policy, remoteness of interest, would
seem generally to be matters merely of
legislative discretion." Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct 437, 441, 71
L.Ed. 749 (1927); see also FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702, 68 S.Ct 793,
804, 92 L.E& 1010 (1948) ("most matters
relating to judicial disqualification [do] not
rise to a constitutional level"). Moreover,
the traditional common-law rule was that
disqualification for bias or prejudice was
not permitted. See, e.g., Clyma v. Kennedy, 64 Conn. 310, 29 A. 539 (1894). See
generally Frank, Disqualification
of
Judges, 56 Yale LJ. 605 (1947). As Blackby the payment of Justice Embry's claim.
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stone put it, "the law will not suppose a
possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who
is already sworn to administer impartial
justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea/' 3
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *361. The
more recent trend has been towards the
adoption of statutes that permit disqualification for bias or prejudice. See Berger v.
United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31, 41 S.Ct
230, 232, 65 LEd. 481 (1921) (enforcing
statute disqualifying federal judges in certain circumstances for personal bias or
prejudice). See also ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon 3CUXa) (1980) ("[A] judge
should disqualify himself ... where he has
a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party"). But that aione would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional
requirement under the Due Process Clause.
We held in Patterson v. New York, <32
U.S. 197, 201-202, 97 S.Ct 2319, 2322-2323,
53 LEd.2d 281 (1977) (citations omitted),
that
"it is normally within the power of the
State to regulate procedures under which
its laws are carried out ... and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause
unless it offends some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
[2,3] We need not decide whether allegations of bias or prejudice by a judge of
the type we have here would ever be sufficient under the Due Process Clause to
force recusal. Certainly only in the most
extreme of cases would disqualification on
this basis be constitutionally required, and
appellant's arguments here fall well below
that level. Appellant suggests that Justice
Embry's general frustration with insurance
companies reveals a disqualifying bias, but
it is likely that many claimants have developed hostile feelings from the frustration
in awaiting settlement of insurance claims.
Insurers, on their side, have no easy task,
especially when trying to evaluate whether
certain medical diagnostic tests or prolonged hospitalization were indicated. In
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turn, the physicians and surgeons, whether
impelled by valid medical judgment or by
apprehension as to future malpractice
claims—or some combination of the two—
similarly face difficult problems. Appellant's allegations of bias and prejudice on
this general basis, however, are insufficient
to establish any constitutional violation.
B
The record in this case presents more
than mere allegations of bias and prejudice,
however. Appellant also presses a claim
that Justice Embry had a more direct stake
in the outcome of this case. In Tumey,
while recognizing that the Constitution
does not reach every issue of judicial qualification, the Court concluded that "it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment
... to subject [a person's] liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of
which has a direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case." 273 U.S., at 523,
47 S.Ct, *t 441.
More than 30 years ago Justice Black,
speaking for the Court, reached a similar
conclusion and recognized that under the
Due Process Clause no judge "can be a
judge in his own case [or be] permitted to
try cases where he has. an interest in the
outcome." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136, 75 S.Ct 623, 625, 99 UEA 942 (1955).
He went on to acknowledge that what degree or kind of interest is sufficient to
disqualify a judge from sitting "cannot be
defined with precision." Ibid Nonetheless, a reasonable formulation of the
issue is whether the
"situation is one 'which would offer a
possible temptation to the average ...
judge to ... lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true.'" Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S., at 60,
93 S.Ct, at 83.
[4] Under these prior holdings, we examine just what factors might constitute
such an interest in the outcome of this case
that would bear on recusal. At the time
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Justice Embry cast the deciding vote and
authored the court's opinion, he had pending at least one very similar bad faith refusal-to-pay lawsuit against Blue Cross in
another Alabama court The decisions of
the court on which Justice Embry sat,2 the
Alabama Supreme Court, are binding on all
Alabama courts. We need not blind ourselves to the fact that the law in the area
of bad faith refusal-to-pay claims in Alabama, as in many other jurisdictions, was
unsettled at that time, as the court's close
division in deciding this case indicates.
When Justice Embry cast the deciding
vote, he did not merely apply well-established law and in fact quite possibly made
new law; the court's opinion does not suggest that its conclusion was compelled by
earlier decisions. Instead, to decide the
case the court stated "it is first necessary
to review the policy considerations, elements, and instructive guide posts set out
by this court in earlier case law." 470
So.2d, at 1070. And in another case the
court acknowledged that "the tort of bad
faith refusal to pay a valid insurance claim
is in the embryonic stage, and the Court
has not had occasion to address every issue
that might arise in these cases/' National
Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Button, 419 So.2d,
at 1362.
The decision under review firmly established that punitive damages could be obtained in Alabama in a situation where the
insured's claim is not fully approved and
only partial payment of the underlying
claim had been made. Prior to the decision
under review, the Alabama Supreme Court
had not clearly recognized any claim for
tortious injury in such circumstances;
moreover, it had affirmatively recognized
that partial payment was evidence of good
faith on the part of the insurer. Sexton v.
Liberty National Life Jra& Co., 405 So.2d
18, 22 (1981). The Alabama court also held
that a bad faith refusal-to-pay cause of
action will lie in Alabama even where the
insured is not entitled to a directed verdict
on the underlying claim, a conclusion that
2. Justice Embry has since retired from the court

at the least clarified the thrust of an earlier
holding. Cf. National Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Button, supra, at 1362. Finally, the court refused to set aside as excessive a punitive damages award of $3.5 million. The largest punitive award previously affirmed by that court was $100,000, a
figure remitted from $1.1 million as "obviously the result of passion and prejudice on
the part of the jury." Gulf Atlantic Life
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So.2d 916, 926
(1981).
All of these issues were present in Justice Embry's lawsuit against Blue Cross.
His complaint sought recovery for partial
payment of claims. Also the very nature
of Justice Embry's suit placed in issue
whether he would have to establish that he
was entitled to a directed verdict on the
underlying claims that he alleged Blue
Cross refused to pay before gaining punitive damages. Finally, the affirmance of
the largest punitive damages award ever
(by a substantial margin) on precisely the
type of claim raised in the Blue Cross suit
undoubtedly "raised the stakes" for Blue
Cross in that suit, to the benefit of Justice
Embry. Thus, Justice Embry's opinion for
the Alabama Supreme Court had the clear
and immediate effect of enhancing both the
legal status and the settlement value of his
own case.
We need not decide whether to characterize the decision under review as a change
in Alabama law or a clarification of the
contours of that law, a judgment we are
obviously not called on to make. We hold
simply that when Justice Embry made that
judgment, he acted as "a judge in his own
case/' Murchison, supra, 349 U.S., at 136,
75 S.Ct, at 625.
We also hold that his interest was " 'direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary/ " Ward, 409 U.S., at 60, 93 S.Ct, at
83 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S., at
523, 47 S.Ct, at 441). Justice Embry's
complaint against Blue Cross sought "compensatory damage for breach of contract,
inconvenience, emotional and mental disfor health reasons.
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tress, disappointment, pain and suffering"
in addition to punitive damages for himself
and for the class. Soon after the opinion of
the Alabama Supreme Court in this case
was announced, Blue Cross paid Justice
Embry what he characterized in an interview as "a nice sum," Reply Brief for Appellant 10, n. 8, to settle the suit Records
lodged with this Court show that Justice
Embry received $30,000, which was deposited by his attorney directly into Justice
Embry's personal account To be sure, a
portion of this money may have gone to
Justice Embry's attorney in connection
with the case, even though some materials
before us suggest that his attorney agreed
to waive his fee. Deposition of A. Grey Till
in Clay v. Nationwide Insurance Co., CV78-1148 (Cir.Ct of Mobile Cty., Ala.), pp.
27-29. We are also aware that Justice
Embry obtained a statement in the settlement agreement to the effect that "[t]he
primary object of the institution of this suit
... was to emphasize to defendant Blue
Cross . . . that claims under the Plan be
processed and determined by Blue Cross in
a timely and efficient manner," even
though that type of relief was not sought
specifically in the complaint while monetary relief was. We nonetheless hold that
the "nice sum" that Justice Embry received
directly is sufficient to establish the substantiality of his interest here.
We conclude that Justice Embry's participation in this case violated appellant's due
process rights as explicated in Tumey,
Murckison, and Ward. We make clear
that we are not required to decide whether
in fact Justice Embry was influenced, but
3. The Court in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct.
337, 21 LJEd.2d 301 (1963), stated in dicta that
M
in Tumey, 273 VS., at 524 [47 S.Ct.f at 4411, the
Court held that a decision should be set aside
where there is 'the slightest pecuniary interest'
on the part of the judge... ." Id, 409 VS., at
148, 89 S.Q., at 339. We think this was a
misreading of Tumey. The reference to "the
slightest pecuniary interest" in that opinion
came in a portion of the opinion describing
"cases at common law in England prior to the
separation of colonies from the mother country....- 273 U.S., at 524. 47 S.CU at 441. At a

only whether sitting on the case then before the Supreme Court of Alabama
"would offer a possible temptation ... to
the average [judge] ... [to] lead him to not
to hold the balance nice, clear and true."
Ward, supra, 409 U.S., at 60, 93 S.Ct, at
83. The Due Process Clause "may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no
actual bias and who would do their very
best to weigh the scales of justice equally
between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way,
'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice/" Murckison, 349 U.S., at 136, 75
S.Ct, at 625 (citation omitted).
C
[5] Appellant has challenged not only
the participation of Justice Embry in this
case but also the participation of all the
other justices of the Alabama Supreme
Court, or at least the six justices who did
not withdraw from Justice Embry's class
action against Blue Cross, claiming that
they also have an interest in' this case.
Such allegations do not constitute a sufficient basis for requiring recusal under the
Constitution. In the first place, accepting
appellant's expansive contentions might require the disqualification of every judge in
the State. If so, it is possible that under a
"rule of necessity" none of the judges or
justices would be disqualified. See United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214, 101 S.Ct
471, 480, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980).
More important,* while these justices
might conceivably
have had a slight pecuniary interest,3 we find it impossible to charlater point in the opinion, Chief Justice Taft
quoted approvingly from the work of Justice
Cooiey, that disqualification is not worked in
cases where the M "interest is so remote, trifling
and insignificant that it may fairly be supposed
to be incapable of affecting the judgment of or
of influencing the conduct of an individual/"
Id, at 533, 47 S.O., at 444 (quoting T Cooiey,
Constitutional Limitations 594 (7th ed 1903)).
Chief Justice Taft also reiterated that the case
was not one "in which the penalties and the
costs are negligible
The court is a state
agency, imposing substantial punishment....
It is not to be treated as a mere village tribunal
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acterize that interest as " 'direct, personal,
substantial, [and] pecuniary/ " Ward, supra, 409 U.S., at 60, 93 S.Ct, at 83 (quoting
Tumey, supra, 273 U.S., at 523, 47 S.Ct, at
441). Appellant concedes that nothing in
the record even suggests that these justices had any knowledge of the class action
before the court issued a decision on the
merits. Thus, at most only the decision to
deny rehearing was even plausibly affected. Any interest that they might have had
when they passed on the rehearing motion
was clearly highly speculative and contingent At the time, the trial court had not
even certified a class, let alone awarded
any class relief of a pecuniary nature.
With the proliferation of class actions involving broadly defined classes, the application of the constitutional requirement of
disqualification must be carefully limited.
Otherwise constitutional disqualification arguments could quickly become a standard
feature of class-action litigation. Cf. In re
City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925 (CAS 1984).
At some point, "[t]he biasing influence ...
[will be] too remote and insubstantial to
violate the constitutional constraints."
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243,
100 S.Ct 1610, 1614, 64 LEd.2d 182 (1980).
Charges of disqualification should not be
made lightly See Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 UJS. 413, 44 S.Ct 149, 68
LEd. 362 (1923). We hold that there is no
for village peccadilloes." 273 VS., at 532, 47
S.Ct., a* 444. We therefore follow Ward v. ViU
lage of Monroevitte, 409 U.S. 57, 60, 93 S.Ct 80,
83. 34 L.Ed2d 267 (1972), and decline to read
Tumey as constitutionalizing any rule that a
decision rendered by a judge with "the slightest
pecuniary interest" constitutes a violation of the
Due Process Clause.
4. We have confined the opinion to the issues
presented by the parties and express no view on
the question discussed by the Justices who write
separately. The issues here are far more complex than acknowledged by the concurrences,
which, reasoning from hypothetical situations
on matters not presented by the facts of this
case, postulate a broad general rule. Traditionally the Court does not undertake to " 'formulate
a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.'" Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Au-

basis for concluding these justices were
disqualified under the Due Process Clause.
D
[6] Having concluded that only Justice
Embry was disqualified from participation
in this case, we turn to the issue of the
proper remedy for this constitutional violation. Our prior decisions have not considered the question of whether a decision
of a multimember tribunal must be vacated
because of the participation of one member
who had an interest in the outcome of the
case. Rather, our prior cases have involved interpretations of statutes with provisions concerning this question, e.g., Commonwealth Corp. v. Casualty Co., 393
U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 301
(1968), disqualifications of the sole member
of a tribunal, e.g., Ward v. Village ofMonroeville, supra, and disqualifications of an
entire panel, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488
(1973). Some courts have concluded that a
decision need not be vacated where a disqualified judge's vote is mere surplusage.
See, e.g., State ex reL Langer v. Kositzky,
38 N.D. 616, 166 N.W. 534 (1918); but see,
e.g., Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 NT. 547
(1850).4 But we are aware of no case, and
none has been called to our attention, permitting a court's decision to stand when a
disqualified judge casts the deciding vote.
Here Justice Emhry's vote was decisive in
the 5-to-4 decision5 and he was the author
thority, 297 VS. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct 466. 483. 80
L.£d. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(quoting Liverpool N. Y. <£ P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 VS. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352,
355, 28 L.£d. 899 (1885)). Because the issue of
disqualification of a single member of a multimember panel arises in a variety of factual
contexts, see generally CJS. Judges § 159, p.
868 (collecting cases), sound judicial practice
wisely counsels judges to avoid unnecessary
declarations on issues not presented, briefed, or
argued.
5* If Justice Embry had disqualified himself, the
decision of the trial court would not have been
affirmed by a vote of an equally divided court.
Rather, AiaXode § 12-2-14 (1975). which authorizes the appointment of special justices in
the event disqualifications result in an evennumbered court which is evenly divided on a
matter, would presumably have come into play.
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of the court's opinion. Because of Justice
Embry's leading role in the decision under
review, we conclude that the "appearance
of justice" will best be served by vacating
the decision and remanding for further proceedings. Appellees have not contended
that, upon a finding of disqualification, this
disposition is improper.
Ill
We underscore that our decision today
undertakes to answer only the question of
under what circumstances the Constitution
requires disqualification. The Due Process
Clause demarks only the outer boundaries
of judicial disqualifications. Congress and
the States, of course, remain free to impose
more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than those we find mandated
here today.
Appellant also argues that the retrospective imposition of punitive damages under a
new cause of action violates its rights under the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10; that a $3.5 million punitive damage
award is impermissible under the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment;
and that lack of sufficient standards governing punitive damage awards in Alabama
violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment In addition, appellant contends that Ala.Code § 12-22-72
(1975), under which any person who unsuccessfully appeals a money judgment is assessed 10% penalty, is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment These arguments
raise important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved; however,
our disposition of the recusal-for-bias issue
makes it unnecessary to reach them.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Alabama is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
Justice STEVENS took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
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Justice BRENNAN, concurring.
I agree with the Court that, given Justice
Embry's interest in the outcome of this
case, his participation in its disposition violated due process. As the Court notes,
resolution of the issues raised in the appeal
below enhanced the viability and settlement
value of Justice Embry's own lawsuit.
Such an interest clearly required recusal
under our decisions in Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927);
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct.
623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955); Ward v. Village
of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34
L.Ed.2d 267 (1972); and Gibson v. Berryhill 411 U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d
488 (1973). As Justice Black explained in
In re Murchison, supra:
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process. Fairness of
course requires an absence of actual bias
in the trial of cases. But our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness. To
this end no man can be a judge in his
own case and no man is permitted to try
cases where he has an interest in the
outcome." 349 U.S., at 136, 75 S.Ct, at
625.
I write separately to set forth my understanding of certain statements in the
Court's opinion. First, the Court stresses
that Justice Embry's interest was " 'direct,
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary/"
Ante, at 1586 (quoting Ward, supra, 409
U.S., at 60, 93 S.Ct, at 83); see also, ante,
at 1588. I do not understand that by this
language the Court states that only an
interest that satisfies this test will taint the
judge's participation as a due process violation. Nonpecuniary interests, for example,
have been found to require recusal as a
matter of due process. See, e.g., In re
Murchison, supra (judge who presided
over a "one-man grand jury" also presided
over contempt proceedings relating to
events which took place in the grand jury
proceedings). Moreover, as this case demonstrates, an interest is sufficiently "direct" if the outcome of the challenged pro-
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ceeding substantially advances the judge's
opportunity to attain some desired goal
even if that goal is not actually attained in
that proceeding. See, e.g.f Ward v. Village
of Monroeville, supra (mayor's adjudication of traffic fines, which contributed to
city finances, violated due process); Gibson
v. Berryhill supra (proceedings by Alabama Board of Optometry enjoined because
Board members were competitors of petitioners and therefore stood to gain competitively). Nothing in the Court's opinion
should be read, as I understand it, to limit
these precedents in any way. Rather, the
Court clearly indicates the contrary in acknowledging that the interests which trigger due process condemnation "cannot be
defined with precision." Ante, at 1585
(quoting In re Murckison, supra, 349 U.S.,
at 136, 75 S.Ct., at 625).
Second, the Court points out that Justice
Embry obtained a favorable settlement in
his own lawsuit several months after the
Alabama Supreme Court handed down its
decision in this case. But even without
that settlement, Justice Embry's participation in this case deprived appellant of
due process. The deprivation occurred
when Justice Embry took part in the deliberations and decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in this case. At most—and,
again, I do not read the Court's opinion to
say otherwise—the fact of the later settlement merely confirms that Justice Embry
had a substantial interest in the outcome of
this case.
Finally, I understand that the Court's
opinion is not to be read to suggest that the
outcome might be different had Justice
Embry not provided the necessary fifth
vote in the court below. That fact too is
irrelevant—Justice Embry's participation in
the court's resolution of the case, while he
was fully aware of his interest in its outcome, was sufficient in itself to impugn the
decision. The description of an opinion as
being "for the court" connotes more than
merely that the opinion has been joined by
a majority of the participating judges. It
reflects the fact that these judges have

exchanged ideas and arguments in deciding
the case. It reflects the collective process
of deliberation which shapes the court's
perceptions of which issues must be addressed and, more importantly, how they
must be addressed., And, while the influence of any single participant in this process can never be measured with precision,
experience teaches us that each member's
involvement plays a part in shaping the
court's ultimate disposition. The participation of a judge who has a substantial
interest in the outcome of a case of which
he knows at the time he participates necessarily imports a bias into the deliberative
process. This deprives litigants of the assurance of impartiality that is the fundamental requirement of due process.
Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice
MARSHALL joins, concurring in the judgment
I join the Court's judgment that Justice
Embry's participation in this case denied
appellant the impartial decisionmaker required by the Due Process Clause. I write
separately, however, to stress that the constitutional violation in this case should not
depend on the Court's apparent belief that
Justice Embry cast the deciding vote—a
factual assumption that may be incorrect
and, to my mind, should be irrelevant to the
Court's analysis. For me, Justice Embry's
mere participation in the shared enterprise
of appellate decisionmaking—whether or
not he ultimately wrote, or even joined, the
Alabama Supreme Court's opinion—posed
an unacceptable danger of subtly distorting
the decisionmaking process.
The Court states that a decision cannot
be permitted to stand "when a disqualified
judge casts the deciding vote. Here, Justice Embry's vote was decisive in the fiveto-four decision and he was the author of
the court's opinion." Ante, at 1588-1589.
In a footnote, the Court elaborates on the
decisiveness of Justice Embry's vote: had
he disqualified himself, the decision of the
trial court would not have been affirmed by
an equally divided court because, under

UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS

1591

Cite aft 106 S.Ct. 1591 (1986)

Alabama law, a special justice would have
been appointed to break the tie. Ante, at
1589, n. 5.
The record, however, casts doubt upon
the Court's suggestion that Justice Embry
provided the most crucial vote. Justice
Embry's deposition testimony in the Blue
Cross suit suggests that the initial vote of
the Alabama Supreme Court was in fact to
reverse the decision of the trial court in
favor of the Lavoies. Accordingly, Justice
Embry began work on a dissent App. to
Juris. Statement 168a-169a. After Justice
Embry began writing, however, at least
one justice switched his vote. Justice Embry's proposed dissent ultimately was issued as the per curiam opinion of the
court. He explained: "It's customary a lot
of times [to issue an opinion as a per
curiam ], if it's been assigned to you because the other opinion didn't prevail
"
Id., at 167a.
We cannot know what led each justice on
the Alabama Supreme Court to the position
he or she reached in this case. But we do
know, from our own experience on this
9-member Court, that a forceful dissent
may lead Justices to rethink their original
positions and change their votes. And to
suggest that the author of an opinion
where the final vote is 5-4 somehow plays
a peculiarly decisive "leading role," ante,
at 1589, ignores the possibility of a case
where the author's powers of persuasion
produce an even larger margin of votes. It
makes little sense to intimate that if Jus*
tice Embry's dissent had led two colleagues
to switch their votes, and the final vote had
been 6-3, Aetna would somehow not have
been injured by his participation.

the other judges who participated in a case
ignores the possibility that the collegial
decisionmaking process that is the hallmark of multimember courts led the author
to alter the tone and actual holding of the
opinion to reach a majority, or to attain
unanimity. And because this collegial exchange of ideas occurs in private, a reviewing court may never discover the actual
effect a biased judge had on the outcome of
a particular case. We should not attempt
the perhaps futile task of distilling Justice
Embry's particular contribution to determine whether the result would have been
the same had he disqualified himself at the
outset. I would not want other appellate
courts to read the Court's opinion today to
suggest that such an inquiry provides an
appropriate guarantee of due process.
The violation of the Due Process Clause
occurred when Justice Embry sat on this
case, for it was then the danger arose that
his vote and his views, potentially tainted
by his interest in the pending Blue Cross
suit, would influence the votes and views
of his colleagues. The remaining events—
that another justice switched his vote and
that Justice Embry wrote the court's opinion—illustrate, but do not create, the constitutional infirmity that requires us to vacate the judgment of the Alabama Supreme
Court
(q
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